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ABSTRACT
Between 1562 and 1565, French Protestants made several attempts to fortify 
and claim the southeastern coast of North America, or La Florida. These 
attempts failed and have been largely forgotten. However, these French 
activities were deeply connected to English settlement efforts that occurred in 
the same region soon after, efforts that are commonly viewed as the beginning 
of modern America. As such, they are part of a complex and important historical 
narrative. European powers created and adapted languages of power to create 
new imperial communications, and these events in Florida played a significant 
role in that development. Through examining the interconnectivity of these 
colonial forays, this essay will examine how French and English imperial efforts 
in the second half of the sixteenth century both reflected and shaped inter­
imperial relations and conceptions of enacted sovereignty.
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Introduction
In the summer of 1562, Captain Jean Ribault stood somewhere on what is now 
the South Carolina coast and gave a stirring speech to the men under his command as 
they were facing “the greatest opportunity that you will ever have to advance 
yourselves and your honor.” These men were part of the first French attempt to 
establish a lasting presence in North America, an effort to set up a stronghold on the 
Florida coast to challenge Spanish claims over the area. Ribault invoked the example 
of many Romans who “triumphed by their own work rather than by greatness of their 
parentage” and helped Rome come to rule the world. And, in a rousing conclusion, 
Ribault implored his men to “remember that for this you will always be revered as 
those who were the first to live in this strange land.. .1 promise you to bring your 
names so forcefully to the ears of the king and the princes that your fame shall 
hereafter shine inextinguishably in the heart of France.”1 Starting with this 
expedition, Europeans became a constant presence on the Atlantic coast of the 
continent. Or, as congressman-tumed-historian Charles Bennett writes, “Thus began 
the permanent settlement by Europeans within the present limits of the United 
States.”2 Yet the settlement at Charlesfort was abandoned, destroyed, and largely 
forgotten for centuries.
Spain viewed the southeastern coast of North America as under Spanish 
imperial possession, but neither France nor England accepted this claim. Between
1 Charles Bennett, “The First Voyage of the French to Florida, Made in 1562 by Captain Jean 
Ribault” in Three Voyages; Rene Laudonniere, Charles E. Bennett, ed. (Tuscaloosa:
University o f Alabama Press, 2001), 32-34.
Bennett, “Introduction” in Three Voyages; Rene Laudonniere, Charles E. Bennett, ed. 
(Tuscaloosa: University o f Alabama Press, 2001), xvi.
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1561 and 1565, French-sponsored attempts to settle on the coast of what they called 
“Terra Florida” floundered and failed. These attempts were geographically divided 
into two main efforts: the first on what is now Parris Island in South Carolina where 
soldiers and sailors established Charlesfort. The second effort occurred near present- 
day Jacksonville, Florida and consisted of a larger group of men and, eventually, 
some women and children at a fortification named Fort Caroline. Both of these 
attempts suffered strain and disorder, often due to dependence on France for 
reinforcements which, when slow in coming, caused a reliance on local Native 
Americans that lead to frayed relations and, often, violence. Charlesfort failed due to 
lack of reinforcements, while Fort Caroline lasted long enough to be destroyed in a 
Spanish attack. Similarly, the first significant English effort to establish a presence in 
North America, at Roanoke in 1585 failed due to lack of reinforcement from England, 
and both Roanoke and Jamestown existed in perpetual fear of Spanish attack. In The 
Jamestown Project, historian Karen Kupperman argued that “Laudonniere’s colony 
endured the classic experiences of early colonization: a breakdown of order and 
purpose in the men, who found life in America far different from their expectations; 
the onset of debilitating diseases, which attacked the commander among others; and 
worsening relations with the Timucuans, who resisted pressure to provide the French 
with food.” Charlesfort and Fort Caroline set the mold, in some ways, for the classic 
narrative arc that historians have come to expect from these early colonial ventures.
American founding myths loom large in the national imagination, usually
starting with the “Lost Colony” of Roanoke, moving through Jamestown and to the
3 Karen Ordahl Kupperman, The Jamestown Project (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 82.
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Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock. Americans often remain unaware of earlier colonial 
activities in the same areas, while American historians have traditionally limited their 
study to within the parameters of this common narrative. In recent generations, the 
discipline of Early American History has expanded forwards and backwards across 
time, stretched across the Atlantic and even to the Pacific, opened to theoretical 
discussions on the concepts of empire, race, gender, and colonization, and made vast 
strides towards including Native Americans, and African Americans, in these new 
perspectives. American history is no longer confined to the continent of America or to 
the powerful men who have been credited with creating the United States. But often, 
discussion of American history has been divided by empire and language. English, 
French, and Spanish efforts on the North American continent remain, often, in 
separate texts.
These lingering separations have led to lasting misconceptions about 
American history. Ideas batted about in academia flow into popular histories and 
school systems, ideally bringing new perspectives and ideas to Americans’ self- 
perceptions. But, because American historians largely research and publish in 
English, these stories remain limited to the activities of the English, and therefore 
only starting, at best, in the 1580s. The Spanish and the French were in the area that 
became the United States, and in surprisingly large numbers, years before the English 
arrived. The legendary “Lost Colony” of Roanoke regularly appears in American 
popular culture, a combination myth and ghost story yet American imaginations are 
not similarly captured by the accounts of Spanish shipwrecks scattering gold from 
Florida to the Carolinas or the tales of Spanish survivors of these disasters
3
disappearing into the continent, living with the Indians they encounter.4 Spanish 
expeditions, led by men such as Coronado and de Soto, did not lead to Spanish 
settlement in North America, but their interactions with the Native Americans, 
especially the violent clashes, left a decided imprint on the Spanish idea of America 
and Native American ideas of Europeans. Bennett argues that, due to the spectacular 
failures of many of these expeditions, Spanish leaders considered cutting off any 
imperial efforts north of Mexico but changed their minds when they heard of the 1562 
French expedition.5 The English soon followed, perhaps desiring not to be left behind 
completely, especially as accounts of expeditions in America became widely
tVipublished in England towards the end of the 16 century.
In The Jamestown Project, historian Karen Kupperman examined these pre- 
Jamestown colonial attempts as they reflected and shaped European actions up to and 
through 1607. In discussing the many colorful characters in each of these dramas, 
Kupperman emphasized the “tangled world in which these actors moved,” drawing 
out the careers of many who moved between the Americas, Africa, and the metropole 
frequently, men whose lives often included unclear allegiance, surprising alliances, 
and, most notably, remarkable adaptability. According to Kupperman’s analysis, "the
4 Roanoke has been heavily mythologized in popular culture. In the past few years, for 
example, versions o f legends based on the lost colonists at Roanoke have appeared on two 
popular televisions shows based on magic and folklore: Supernatural and Sleepy Hollow; 
Stories o f such shipwrecks appear in both Jean Ribault and Rene Goulaine de Laudonniere’s 
accounts o f their expeditions. Karen Kupperman also includes many examples in The 
Jamestown Project, discussing how the “fate... o f the thousands shipwrecked or otherwise 
marooned on American shores, is unrecorded, presumably those who survived melted into 
Indian Life.” Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 88.
5 Bennett, “Introduction” in Three Voyages, xvi.
6 For more information on English awareness o f these expeditions, see Peter C. Mancall, 
Hakluyt's Promise: An Elizabethan Obsession for an English America (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007).
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ability to read cues in the environment and respond to changing circumstances 
marked those who succeeded; presumably the countless unknown others who are lost 
to history were either unlucky or slow to adapt.”7 Legal scholar Lauren Benton drew 
similar conclusions, but on a much larger and less personal scale. She argued that 
empires “composed a fabric that was full of holes, stitched together out of pieces, a 
tangle of strings.”8 Those engaged in imperial projects, then, had to navigate these 
tangles and had to build lives out of this daunting confusion. Because of the 
inherently tangled nature of such enterprises, any attempts to sever these actions from 
those that occur later at Roanoke and Jamestown must be artificial, and the 
reoccurring connections between the empires and lives of those involved show just 
how false that long-standing divide has been.
The actions of the French, English, and Spanish surrounding the French 
settlements of Charlesfort and Fort Caroline show to what extent the actors of each 
empire were keenly aware of these complex jurisdictions. In the context of imperial 
expansion, competition defined inter-imperial attitudes. When one power gained 
control over the land or influence among the natives, others could either force them 
out, possibly at great expense, or hope that these gains did not last. Influence meant 
more resources, which in turn would be used to gain more territory and more 
influence. France, England, and Spain watched each other very closely, seeing every 
incremental gain for one as a blow to the others. Using the concept Benton articulates 
as “legal posturing,” the people involved in these ventures tried to create and express
7 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 44, 48.
8 Lauren Benton, A Search For Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 
1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2.
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sovereignty through specific, often ceremonial, acts. Patricia Seed further analyzed 
how the logic behind different forms of posturing, specifically ceremonies, was rarely 
articulated by those involved, as they assumed the meaning was understood.9 
Therefore, much of this essay will be devoted to explaining and articulating various 
examples of legal posturing and the possible motives behind them. Of course, we 
cannot know the direct intent of any action. Yet, through focusing on accounts 
produced by each of these actors and seeing how they framed or explained their 
behavior, we can begin to glimpse some of their probable logic. Furthermore, through 
examining the actual as well as perceived overlap between French and English 
colonial efforts in this time and place, this essay will provide further support for 
Benton’s idea of tangled empires, and better articulate how these particular ventures 
should not be forced apart in further study. Looked at together, the events on the coast 
of La Florida between 1560 and 1607 reveal stunning overlaps and parallels and 
prove how tangled and unsure imperial sovereignty was at this point in American 
history, and how different European imperial actors perceived, expressed, and 
attempted to create control in the midst of these tangled events. Charlesfort, Fort 
Caroline, Roanoke, and Jamestown have traditionally been viewed as separate 
projects but were in fact deeply connected through geography, people, and goals. 
More than that, these colonial efforts share a role in the complex development of the 
nascent international language and law of imperial sovereignty and in the ever- 
shifting international diplomacy between European powers in the second half of the 
sixteenth century.
9 Patricia Seed, Ceremonies o f  Possession in Europe’s Conquest o f  the New World, 1492- 
1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3.
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In the 1560s, Admiral de Coligny, a powerful Huguenot leader, sought to 
establish a permanent French presence in Florida. He found support in Catherine de 
Medici, the Queen Mother who ruled as regent for her young son Charles IX. France 
had not yet devolved into internal religious war but tensions were high between 
Catholics and Protestants. Catherine sought to ensure peace and a stable kingdom for 
her son through moderation, with moderate Protestant Coligny as an ally.10 Coligny 
hoped that uniting against Spain could override any religious divisions within 
France.11 On February 18, 1562, he had achieved his wish when a fleet under the 
command of Jean Ribault departed France with the stated goal of receiving “rich and 
inestimable commodities as other nations have don, by taking in hand such farre 
navegacions, both to the honnour and praise of theire Kinges and prynces, and to the
1 9increase of great proffite and use of their comon wealthes.” Ribault’s ships reached 
Florida in late April, finding the St. John’s River on May 1st and naming it the River 
of May. He placed a stone column featuring the royal coat of arms on a bluff 
overlooking the river, announcing to anyone familiar with that symbol exactly who 
this land now belonged to. Heading north, and naming rivers after those he knew in 
France, Ribault eventually reached the body of water now called Port Royal Sound,
10 For a helpful summary o f religious conflict in sixteenth-century France, see Mack P. Holt, 
The French Wars o f  Religion, 1562-1629 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
This text was originally published in 1995 and a second edition in 2005. For discussions of 
Catherine de Medici’s moderation and relationship with Coligny, see chapters 1 and 2.
11 For more discussion o f royal support and Coligny’s possible motives, see Philip P. 
Boucher, France and the American Tropics to 1700: Tropics o f  Discontent? (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), Chapter 2; John T. McGrath, The French in Early 
Florida: In the Eye o f  the Hurricane (Gainesville: University Press o f Florida, 2000), 
especially chapters 3 and 4.
12 Jean Ribault, The whole & true discouerye o f  Terra Florida, ed. H. P. Biggar, (Gainesville, 
FL: University o f Florida Press, 1964), 54. This edition is a facsimile o f a document 
originally published in London.
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an estuary in Beaufort County, South Carolina. There, Ribault raised another column.
Leaving only twenty-six men behind, on June 11, Ribault returned to France
with the majority of his force, including his lieutenant Rene de Goulaine de
Laudonniere. There, he hoped to gather support, supplies, and reinforcements. The
small group left behind built and named Charlesfort. Due to a lack of their own food
supplies, this group leaned heavily on trade with the local Native Americans. This
persistent reliance stressed the Indians’ resources and taxed their goodwill, while the
relations inside Charlesfort deteriorated into chaos, mutiny, and murder. The men
rebelled against their appointed leader, Captain Albert de la Pierria, for his strictness,
eventually killing him after he banished one of the soldiers. Finally, after over a year
of waiting for reinforcements from France that never came, a small group of survivors
constructed a makeshift boat to return to France. Despite starvation and at least one
incidence of cannibalism during the voyage, the men were picked up by an English
1 ^ship and eventually returned to France.
When they returned to France, Ribault, Laudonniere, and their men found a 
country in the midst of the first French War of Religion that began in March 1562. 
Ribault himself fought with Protestant rebels against the government siege of 
Dieppe.14 After the city fell, he traveled to England, both to avoid punishment and to 
gamer support for a return voyage from Queen Elizabeth I. As a powerful Protestant 
ruler, she seemed to be Ribault’s best hope for aid. Intrigued by the possibilities of 
Florida, Queen Elizabeth gave her approval, and preparations began to send a small
13 The most complete timeline o f these events can be found in the introduction to Charles E. 
Bennett’s translation of Three Voyages, xiii-xviii.
14 Boucher, France and the American Tropics to 1700, 48.
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fleet. However, the English did not seem to trust Ribault, and Ribault displayed 
unease at working with England instead of France. He was arrested while trying to 
find a way back to France with several of his men. His men were bailed out to assist 
the British expedition, which ended up not in Florida, but in the Bay of Biscay when 
their commander, Thomas Stukeley, decided he would rather raid Spanish fleets than 
sail across the Atlantic.15 For several years, Ribault remained imprisoned. Most of the 
survivors of Charlesfort were also imprisoned in Britain, despite French efforts to 
gain Ribault’s and their return.16 Somewhere between his imprisonment and a later 
return to Florida, Ribault wrote his account of the 1562 expedition.17
After the Edict of Amboise ended the war in 1563, Coligny sought to organize 
a trip to bring relief to Charlesfort as soon as possible as he was unaware of their 
departure. With Ribault unavailable, command passed to Laudonniere. Somewhere 
between the time the relief voyage was organized and the time it departed, their 
mission changed and a return voyage went ahead without the motivation of a rescue. 
One of the men who later mutinied and left Fort Caroline, Stefano de Rojomonte, was 
interviewed by Spanish officials and he claimed that the survivors of Charlesfort had 
reached France a month before the 1564 expedition’s departure, and “that one of them 
had come in the said armada and that others had been taken prisoner on account of the
15 Kupperman includes an amusing and comprehensive discussion of Sir Thomas Stukeley in 
The Jamestown Project, 45-50.
16 For further discussion o f Ribault's imprisonment, see McGrath, The French in Early 
Florida, chapter 5.
17 This document has slightly unclear origins. An English version published in 1563 claimed 
to be a translation o f a French version, but no French version has been confirmed. For the full 
discussion, see H. P. Biggar’s notes in The whole & true discouerye o f  Terra Florida, 48-52.
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death of Captain Albert.”18 It seems likely that at least one of the men from 
Charlesfort was on this second voyage, especially as Laudonniere discusses the 
opinions of those who were at Charlesfort when he picks the location for Fort 
Caroline. This voyage was much larger than the first, consisting of three hundred men 
(and one woman, a maid to Laudonniere).19 Instead of hurrying to Charlesfort, 
Laudonniere chose the River of May for his base, agreeing with the assessment of the 
survivors from Charlesfort that this land was superior. There, his men built Fort 
Caroline, near modern-day Jacksonville, where they remained for “two Sommers and 
one whole Winter.”20
Despite a lengthier stay, this project faced numerous troubles. Repeatedly, 
Laudonniere had to deal with insurrections and insubordination; on one occasion, he 
ended up imprisoned in a ship’s hold while other of his ships were stolen by 
mutineers intent on gaining riches by attacking Spanish ships throughout the Indies. 
Laudonniere and the settlement persisted, some of the mutineers even returning only 
to be executed. However, the people of Fort Caroline eventually faced starvation.
Like at Charlesfort, the French at Fort Caroline depended on the local Native 
Americans, the Timucuans, for food, and this relationship soured. Desperate, they 
prepared ships to leave. Despite minor relief from the arrival of English privateer 
Captain John Hawkins, who traded them some food, they still planned to abandon the 
fort. Yet, in late August 1565, Ribault arrived with a fleet, bringing the much-needed
18 “Deposition o f Stefano de Rojomonte” in Laudonniere and Fort Caroline: History and 
Documents, Charles E. Bennett, ed. (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University o f Alabama Press, 
2001), 97.
19 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 79-80.
20 Laudonniere, A notable historie, 18.
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workforce and supplies. He brought nearly 600 people in all, sailors as well as women 
and children, planning to settle beyond the fortification. Almost immediately after 
Ribault came the Spanish. They destroyed the fort and killed most of the men,
including Ribault. Laudonniere and others managed to escape home and tell of what
0 1happened. Other Frenchmen also published accounts of the Spanish attack, several
• ♦ • 00of which were translated into English. These accounts likely contributed to English
desire to settle, as well as general English and French attitudes towards Spanish 
colonization based on the Black Legend, the idea that the Spanish were uniquely 
cruel, which several of these French accounts could have served to bolster. After the 
destruction of Fort Caroline, French officials abandoned plans of establishing French 
outposts in the region.
Between 1578 and 1590, British leaders made several attempts to establish a 
foothold in North America. English explorers had been involved in the Americas, but 
the English government wanted to start a permanent, if small, population to establish 
a claim that would be recognized by other European powers, a goal likely influenced
0 3by wide English awareness of French activities in Florida. Sir Humphrey Gilbert 
was one of the earliest advocates for English colonization and he and his half-brother, 
Sir Walter Ralegh, significantly shaped early English imperial ventures in the 
Americas. In 1578, with an official patent, Gilbert set out for the Caribbean and the
21 More detailed summaries o f these events can be found in Bennett’s introduction to 
Laudonniere & Fort Caroline: History and Documents, 3-59; and Bennett’s translation of 
Three Voyages, xiii-xxii.
22 For a thorough discussion of all o f these accounts, see “Appendix: A Note on the Sources” 
in McGrath, The French in Early Florida.
23 David B. Quinn, North America from Earliest Discover to First Settlements: The Norse 
Voyages to 1612 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), 322.
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southeastern coast of North America, but bad storms turned back the voyage. Ralegh 
participated in Gilbert’s second attempt in 1583, which landed in Newfoundland. 
Illness and unrest led this attempt to collapse when all present refused to stay through 
the coming harsh winter, and Gilbert’s ship was lost at sea on the return voyage. After 
these failures, Ralegh was awarded a patent in succession to Gilbert’s. He set his 
sights further south on the coast, towards Florida. In 1584, a reconnaissance mission 
traveled to and from the Outer Banks along what is now North Carolina, and brought 
back two famous Algonquians, Manteo and Wanchese, to England.24
In 1585, Elizabeth I offered support for another expedition, knighting Ralegh, 
authorizing the naming of Virginia after herself, and allowing Ralegh the use of one 
of her ships. This expedition traveled through the Caribbean, engaging in a series of 
confusing and unfriendly interactions with Spanish authorities. They then sailed up 
the Florida cost to the Outer Banks and Roanoke Island by the end of July.25 By mid 
August, it had been decided that most vessels would return to England for further 
supplies, especially as some had been lost in the voyage. Ralph Lane was put in 
charge at the fort where he planned to support himself and his men off of the land. 
Relationships with the Native Americans deteriorated until Lane attacked and killed
24 Quinn provides a solid summary o f these events in David B, Quinn, North America From 
Earliest Discovery to First Settlements, especially Chapters 13 and 18. This essay will focus 
specifically on English efforts in southeastern North America, although simultaneous activity 
was occurring in Ireland and towards what is now eastern Canada. This is partially because of  
the more developed scholarship on these attempts, as well as the parallels apparent with the 
French activity in Florida.
25 For more information on these interactions with the Spanish, see David B. Quinn, The 
Roanoke Voyages 1584-1590: Documents to Illustrate the English Voyages to North America 
Under the Patent Granted to Walter Ralegh, Volume 1 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 
1991), Chapter 3.
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Chief Wingina.26 Lane planned to establish a chain of outposts leading up to the 
Chesapeake, wishing to settle the bulk of the English force on that grand bay. Sir 
Francis Drake launched an expedition against Spanish possessions around this time, 
part of a series of coordinated moves against Spain that included the establishment of 
a permanent English presence in North America to serve as a base for ships.27 Drake 
reached Roanoke, where he planned to leave supplies, until a hurricane wrecked some 
of his ships. Drake and Lane decided to abandon the project, and in summer of 1586, 
returned to England.
In the meantime, a relief expedition had formed in England under Ralegh. 
Getting a late start, this fleet left in April 1586 and arrived to find that the men they 
had come to reinforce were gone. This fleet eventually left a small group of men and 
returned again to England. The next expedition left in 1587, led by John White, who 
had sailed with the 1586 fleet, and consisted of one hundred ten people, including 
families. This expedition stopped in Roanoke to pick up that small group of men only 
to find them gone, but the pilot refused to carry to people any further and insisted 
they stay on Roanoke instead of carrying on to the Chesapeake as planned. White’s 
daughter, Eleanor, gave birth to Virginia Dare, the first English child in America, a 
figure who would later assume mythic status. White led an expedition back to 
England in late 1587 to gather reinforcements and return. Yet by early 1588, England 
was back at war with Spain. White managed to secure two small ships that only made
26 For further discussion of interactions between the English at Roanoke and the tribes in the 
area, see Michael Leroy Oberg, The Head in Edward Nugent’s Hand: Roanoke’s Forgotten 
Indians (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 2008). Oberg argues that the colony 
truly failed because Native Americans who had initially welcomed them turned against the 
English.
27 Quinn, The Roanoke Voyages 1584-1590, Vol. 1, 248-251.
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it as far as Madeira before being attacked by French outlaws and having to return to 
England. Finally, in 1590, White sailed to Roanoke, arriving to find the fort deserted, 
with no signs of where the people may have gone. These missing Englishmen and
9 owomen became the famous lost colonists of Roanoke.
The English government raised another voyage in 1607, commanded by 
Captain Christopher Newport. This fleet that reached Virginia in April 1607. Six 
men were named to a governing council, including Captain John Smith. Newport 
returned to England with a report in which the council pushed for England to quickly 
supply more aid lest they be forced to abandon the effort. By the end of summer, one 
councilor had been deposed and two were dead. The English leaned heavily on the 
Indians for food and supplies, but were also continuously baffled by these people, 
unsure of their friendship or ill intentions. The English faced a winter without enough 
food to get them through and tension grew between the men and their leaders. The 
fort was stricken by illness and hunger, and many men died, their numbers shrinking 
from one hundred five to thirty-eight in six months. England realized a need for 
further investment in this colonial attempt, and issued a new charter in 1609, sending 
a much larger fleet that included women to the settlement. A massive storm came up, 
causing two ships, including the one carrying the intended governor and the charter, 
to wreck in Bermuda. The three others made it to the Chesapeake, but barely.
By May 1610, those in Bermuda managed to construct ships and sail to
28 For more detailed summaries, see Quinn, The Roanoke Voyages 1584-1590, Vol. 1 and II; 
Quinn, Set Fair for Roanoke: Voyages and Colonies 1584-1606 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1985); Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Roanoke: The Abandoned Colony, 
2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007). This is by no means an 
exhaustive list, but these books provide a solid grounding in the discussions around Roanoke.
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Virginia, only to find a settlement in ruins at the end of the so-called “starving time.” 
Smith had been injured and sent home, while a drought and harsh conditions further 
increased tension over food between the English and Native Americans. This 
escalated into ongoing war that led to the English never leaving their fortification. 
The ships from Bermuda did not have enough supplies for everyone, and the decision 
was made to abandon the entire effort. However, as the ragged fleet sailed down the 
James River on June 7, 1610, they encountered an English fleet with four hundred 
men and a year’s worth of supplies. Jamestown had been saved, although those who 
had lived through the horrific starving time may have been less than thrilled to stay. 
With continued English investment, Jamestown managed to persist, becoming the 
first permanent English settlement in America.29
Beyond the many parallel events, the French and English efforts to claim a 
small part of North America occurred both geographically and chronologically near 
each other. Both imperial efforts were aimed at undercutting the Spanish, both 
through claiming territory the Spanish believed was theirs and through establishing a 
stronghold from which their own ships could attack the Spanish treasure fleet that 
regularly sailed home with the Gulf Stream current that sweeps up the Atlantic 
coast.30 All of these fortifications, from Charlesfort to Jamestown, were built in fear
29 For a more thorough summary of these events see Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 
Chapters 7 and 8.
The word imperial is fraught, but, for my purposes, it is the best way to briefly describe the 
set o f goals outlined in many of the personal and official documents o f the time, as it hints at 
a wide range o f ideologies, from the economic to the religious to the personal. As Ann Laura 
Stoler and Carole McGranahan suggest “Imperial formations are not steady states, but states 
of becoming.” Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan, “Imperial Formations” in Imperial 
Formations, ed. Stoler et al. (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), 9. In that 
way, “imperial” suggests how those behind such ventures were concerned not with what was,
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of Spanish as well as Native American attacks, and tensions with Spain contributed to 
several colonies’ downfall. Charlesfort, Fort Caroline, and Jamestown all went 
through mutinies, and Laudonniere and John Smith both published their own version 
of these tumultuous events in an effort to justify their actions and secure their legacy. 
Due to their similar geographic locations, all of these efforts were deeply affected by 
hurricanes and by food shortages in southeastern North America that researches have 
now connected to record drought conditions.
England and France were also deeply politically connected at this time. Each 
wanted to diminish Spanish power, and hoped to reap enough riches from the 
Americas to become an equal to the now vast Spanish Empire. Protestant England 
often rallied behind religious rhetoric, worrying about entire continents of people 
being exposed to the wrong version of Christianity. As a Catholic country, French 
rulers were less concerned about this. However, as the Charlesfort and Fort Caroline 
expeditions were largely composed of and led by Protestants, these efforts were even 
more deeply connected with England.32 Ribault ended up in England trying to gamer 
support, and only an English version of his account survives. Laudonniere’s account 
was first published in French in 1586, but was translated by Richard Hakluyt, with a 
dedication to Sir Walter Ralegh and his attempts to establish an English presence on
but with what might be, and with how they could be part o f that present and future ideal. The 
French and English Empires did not yet exist in a formal way, and the French and English 
nations were still in states o f becoming the modem incarnations associated with those names. 
Language in such analysis is inherently imperfect. Therefore, for the duration o f this study, 
“imperial” will be used as shorthand for European desires to expand their influence and 
wealth.
31 For a discussion of this drought, see Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 169-170.
32 Neither Laudonniere nor Ribault mention religion as a significant motivating factor in these 
settlements. Religion seemed to serve as more of tie with England than part o f the larger plan 
for each effort.
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the “selfe same cost neere adioyning” in 15 87.33 Individuals from all of these projects 
have a disquieting tendency to show up in other places, making these colonial 
ventures feel somewhat like a script with a surprisingly small and interconnected cast 
of characters. As an example, young Frances Drake served under John Hawkins on 
the expedition that brought relief, and Frances Drake later rescued the first round of 
Roanoke settlers from suffering a fate similar to those at Charlesfort.
These connections form an intricate web, which will be discussed at greater 
length throughout this essay. Some scholars have made significant headway in 
charting these complex interactions and reappearing figures. English-language 
scholarship has been remarkably silent about the French exploits in Florida, although 
several French scholars have done impressive work on the subject. The most 
noteworthy of these is Frank Lestringant, the author of several large tomes discussing 
the Huguenot experience in the New World in depth, as well as engaging with more 
conceptual issues such as the idea of the savage and the European obsession with 
cannibal legends.34 Philip P. Boucher has the most similar focus of any English- 
language scholars. In 2008, he published France and the American Tropics to 1700: 
Tropics o f discontent?, a work based on the premise that “knowledge of the
33 Richard Hakluyt, "To the Right Worthie and Honorable Gentleman, Sir Walter Ralegh 
knight, seneschal o f the Duchies o f Comewall and Exeter, and L. Warden of the stannaries in 
Devon and Corenwall. R. H. wisheth true felicitie, in Rene Goulaine de Laudonniere, A 
notable historie containing foure voyages made by certayne French captaynes unto Florida, 
trans. R. H. [Richard Hakluyt] (London: Thomas Dawson, 1587), [2].
34 Frank Lestringant, L'experience huguenote au Nouveau Monde: XVIe siecle (Geneve: Libr. 
Droz, 1996); Frank Lestringant, Le huguenot et le sauvage: VAmerique et la controverse 
coloniale en France, au temps des guerres de religion (Paris: Aux Amateurs de livres: 1990); 
one o f his works has also been published in English as Cannibals: The Discovery and 
Representation o f  the Cannibal from Columbus to Jules Verne, trans. Rosemary Morris 
(Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1997).
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intertwined history of France and the American Tropics is far from common, and yet 
is a subject that deserves more scholarly and public awareness.”35 His work, 
including his publication of an online bibliography for France and the American 
Tropics, contributed significantly to advancing the field. However, few scholars have 
followed Boucher’s lines of inquiry, and fewer still have integrated French attempts 
with the activities of others in the same time and place.
In English-language scholarship, small numbers of giants dominate both the 
study of Roanoke and the study of Charlesfort and Fort Caroline. David Beers Quinn 
turned his attention from Irish history to English colonial ventures in general and 
published several definitive works in the study of early English colonial efforts in 
North America. In 1955, he published The Roanoke Voyages 1584-1590: Documents 
to Illustrate the English Voyages to North America under the Patent Granted to 
Walter Raleigh in 1584 which a review praised: “the old standard collections of 
sources of Raleigh’s Virginia are completely superseded by this definitive edition.” 
This was a two-volume work, published along with the Hakluyt Society, and it laid 
the groundwork for much of the scholarship that came after. He also wrote several 
large-scale works covering European explorers in the Americas from the Norse 
through early English colonial efforts and helped to establish the field of Atlantic
35 Boucher, France and the American Tropics to 1700, vii.
36 Ruth A. McIntyre, Review of The Roanoke Voyages 1584-1590: Documents to Illustrate 
the English Voyages to North America under the Patent Granted to Walter Raleigh in 1584, 
ed. David Beers Quinn, The William and Mary Quarterly 13, No. 4 (October 1956): 578-579, 
accessed November 24, http://www.istor.org/stable/1917028, 578.
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'xnHistory. He edited a document collection called New American World: A 
Documentary History o f North America to 1612, the second volume of which was 
entitled Major Spanish Searches in North America. Franco-Spanish Clash in Florida. 
The Beginnings o f Spanish Florida. This work remains less well known than his 
research on English colonization, but he remains one of the few scholars to contribute 
significant work in both fields, though few have followed his example.
In the study of French colonial ventures in Florida, none has had so large an 
impact as Charles E. Bennett. A Florida congressman, Bennett trained as a lawmaker, 
not a historian. However, he spent many years translating and compiling documents 
about Charlesfort and Fort Caroline. He published Laudonniere & Fort Caroline:
• fViHistory and Documents in 1964 (the 400 anniversary of Laudonniere’s fleet sailing 
to Florida) and a translation of Laudonniere’s account, entitled Three Voyages in 
1975, both republished in 2001. He called his first collection “the result of thirty years
o o
of interest and study.” These works brought French accounts of these efforts to an 
American audience for the first time and remain definitive translations, especially as 
no American historian has published a competitive collection. Bennett’s motivations, 
however, owed more to Florida pride and patriotism than pure historical interest, 
framing Laudonniere and Ribault as proto-pilgrims, men striving for religious 
freedom and modernity, men who “helped turn the tide of history in the right
37 Nicholas Canny and Karen Ordahl Kupperman, “The Scholarship and Legacy of David 
Beers Quinn, 1909-2002,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 60, No. 4 (October 2003): 843- 
860, accessed November 24, http://www.istor.org/stable/3491701, 855.
38 Charles E. Bennett, “Preface” in Charles E. Bennett, ed., Laudonniere & Fort Caroline: 
History and Documents (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964), ix.
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direction.” Bennett’s interpretation then taps into larger discussions of the role of 
these stories in building an American national mythology, issues that will be 
discussed at depth in the following pages. Others have built on Bennett’s work to 
assemble more scholarly examinations of the French in Florida. John T. McGrath 
published The French in Early Florida: In the Eye o f the Hurricane in 2000 to 
“[provide] a badly needed accurate reconstruction of these events” and “cast light 
upon how these events affected long term historical developments.”40 McGrath 
provided a solid basis for further inquiry and analysis of these events, including an 
appendix discussing the various surviving accounts of Fort Caroline and the flaws and 
merits of each.
Bennett, Boucher, and McGrath sought to present understudied episodes in the 
history of American colonization and spent most of their work establishing the 
narrative of these events as well as their significance in American and European 
history. It would, then, fall to the scholars who came after to put these imperial efforts 
in conversation with those sponsored by Spain and England. While progress has been 
made in understanding each of these imperial ventures separately, no one has 
examined the myriad ways in which each effort was connected to every other. There 
are serious practical reasons for this. Each of these scholars came from a background 
in either the French or English Atlantic, and others that study the Spanish Atlantic 
have their own specific expertise. British and Spanish imperial studies are both vast 
fields, each with its own canon and debates that can take years to master. Study of 
French activity in North America, at least below Canada, is not as well established in
39 Bennett, Preface, Laudonniere & Fort Caroline: History and Documents, ix.
40 McGrath, The French in Early Florida, 4.
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English scholarship but does have its own deep roots. To perform a study of 
Charlesfort through Jamestown that would come close to satisfying scholars across 
these various fields would require solid grasp of a vast amount of material. It is hard 
to be comfortable enough in all of these languages to give documents from each 
European source an equally deep reading, as an established academic would likely be 
expected to do. Archives are constructed nationally, and research trips can already be 
prohibitively expensive. Not to mention the time scholars would need to spend 
sorting through all of these archives and the massive amount of works produced by 
scholars of the English, French, and Spanish Atlantics. Synthetic analyses of these 
different areas could be the capstone of a career spent painstakingly building such 
broad expertise, but no one has achieved this yet.
Some scholars, notably Paul Hoffman, Karen Kupperman, and, to an extent, 
Quinn, have begun the work of putting English, French, and Spanish actions in the 
Americas and in Europe between 1560 and 1610 in conversation with each other. 
Hoffman produced several books that show how focusing on the Spanish perspective 
in these events helps to link them all together including Spain and the Roanoke 
Voyages in 1987, A New Andalucia and a Way to the Orient: The American Southeast 
During the Sixteenth Century in 1990, and Florida’s Frontiers in 2002. He 
contributed significantly to the scholarship that wished to connect imperial missions 
and ideas often seen as separate, and therefore to necessarily complicate views of 
Early American History. His focus on Florida and the Spanish involvement in the 
area clearly highlights the connections between all of these projects, as both England 
and France, as well as the men in their service, so consistently defined themselves, at
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least partially, through their opposition to Spain.
Another way to look at these colonial efforts together is to present the history of a 
man who did exactly that: Richard Hakluyt. Peter Mancall’s Hakluyt's Promise: An 
Elizabethan Obsession for an English America put Hakluyt firmly within his British 
historical context, comparing him with others publishing similar accounts around the 
same time. Hakluyt was a truly prolific writer who published Ribault’s account and 
translated and published Laudonniere’s as part of an effort to convince English 
leaders, as well as the general public, that missions to the Americas were worthwhile. 
Hakluyt’s writing offers a way to better understand British attitudes towards others’ 
attempts in the Americas and his work becomes a powerful argument for the deep 
interconnectivity of all of these events.
Karen Kupperman’s The Jamestown begins to connect some of these 
narratives, performing important analysis. This book began with the idea that 
Jamestown, with all its disasters and grim legends, was “the creation story from hell” 
and that, as a nation, Americans selected the more palatable popular version of the 
Mayflower story as their true beginnings.41. Kupperman sought to put Jamestown in a 
much larger international context, trying to show the readers how Jamestown was in 
part the product of situations and tensions established in the 16th century through 
interactions in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East. Through this 
view, Jamestown becomes just one in a series of struggles for power between 
England, Spain, and France. Kupperman performed the essential work of showing 
how tangled and interconnected imperial forces, ideas, and actors were at this point
41 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 1.
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so, while this text does not go into great depth about Charlesfort and Fort Caroline, it 
adds to the framework necessary to better understand these events. The Jamestown 
Project shows how historians can make Early American History truly international, 
expanding outward to examine a seemingly endless web of connections and 
complications. Following her example, this essay will combine Kupperman’s analysis 
of interconnectivity with Benton’s discussion of the incomplete and ever-shifting 
reality of imperial sovereignty, using the examples of Charlesfort, Fort Caroline, and 
Roanoke to highlight connections between imperial powers as well as the shifting 
nature of ideas around imperial control and relations between imperial powers.
This analysis will rely on several different accounts to show how the events 
and narratives surrounding Charlesfort and Fort Caroline should be viewed as part of 
the same history as Roanoke and Jamestown, and how these connected events help 
illuminate the tangled nature of legality and allegiance in this time and place. One 
major goal of these exploratory efforts was to report information back to the 
metropole to allow for more successful American ventures. All those involved in each 
of these efforts were keenly aware of the importance of information, none more so 
than the leaders. Kupperman claims that “the most important and influential English 
report of America’s resources and people came out of the earliest colony, Roanoke,” 
the combined effort of Manteo, Thomas Harriot, and John White first published for 
investors in 1588, then published for a wider audience by Richard Hakluyt in 1588’s 
Principal Navigations.42 Yet several English versions of French accounts predate that 
publication.
42 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 144.
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Ribault published his account, The whole & true discouerye o f Terra Florida, 
in 1563 in England. Other accounts of Charlesfort and Fort Caroline soon followed. 
An optimistic letter from a young man at Fort Caroline was published in 1564 and 
another from a captain in 1565, but both were published only in French pamphlets.43 
After the brutal Spanish attack of Fort Caroline, one of the survivors, an elderly 
carpenter named Nicholas Le Challeux, wrote an account that was published in 1566, 
and proved so popular that it was reprinted in four French editions and an English 
translation. Jacques Le Moyne de Morgues, another survivor, published an account in 
Latin in 1591 that did not have an English translation until 1875. Both of these 
survivors’ accounts have been deemed unreliable by many scholars, especially as 
neither author distinguished between what he saw and what he heard.44 Laudonniere’s 
account was not published for a wide audience until 1586 when Richard Hakluyt 
encountered the document during his stay in Paris. Hakluyt completed an English 
translation for publication in London in 1587, a move that Mancall argues was 
deliberately timed to spread encouraging news about the Americas to encourage 
English settlement. No reports had arrived from Roanoke since 1585 and “that silence 
could have been interpreted by potential colonists as a sign of failure in America. 
Hakluyt’s burden, then, was to spin Laudonniere’s account to provide new 
information for colonization.”45 Because of its central role in the career of both 
Laudonniere and Hakluyt, and its publication in the midst of the Roanoke voyages, 
Laudonniere’s account will form the backbone of this essay’s analysis, with other
43 For a discussion of these sources, see their introductions in Bennett, Laudonniere & Fort 
Caroline: History and Documents, 65-75.
44 For a discussion of this, see McGrath, The French in Early Florida, 6, 172-173;
45 Mancall, Hakluyt’s Promise, 170.
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accounts supplementing his.46 Bennett praised Laudonniere’s account as the most 
accurate, yet others have acknowledged its problematic nature as he repeatedly 
constructed the narrative so as to vindicate himself from unpleasant rumors being 
spread.47 However, the relative accuracy of Laudonniere’s account remains separate 
from its value as a source that reveals his intent, the problems he encountered as a 
leader, and his opinions on his interactions with the Spanish and the English. The way 
he frames the events often tells more about the complex nature of these inter-imperial 
interactions than the events themselves. Furthermore, with the added source of 
Hakluyt’s translation, one can see an English attempt to reinterpret the French 
expedition for their own goals.
Many official English documents from this period have been published 
repeatedly over the years. Quinn gathered such sources related to Roanoke and these, 
especially the frequent correspondence between English officials concerned with 
France and Spain’s actions in America and elsewhere, will be used to show 
connections between these imperial efforts as well as how English officials conceived 
of French (and Spanish) claims to Florida. Of course, Quinn carefully selected these 
documents so they do not represent a total cross-section of English diplomatic 
concerns at the time, yet, failing a trip to English archives, these collections provide 
an invaluable starting point. Recently, a wide variety of government documents from 
the Tudor era through the eighteenth century have been digitized and are available
46 Most analysis will be based on Bennett’s translation of Laudonniere’s account in Three 
Voyages. However, Hakluyt’s translation will also be used as a separate source, and in 
comparison to Bennett’s to highlight useful differences between the two.
47 For further discussion of the merits and faults of Laudonniere’s account, see McGrath, The 
French in Early Florida, 172-173.
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through State Papers Online. For the purposes of this essay, analysis of English 
official documents will be limited to those that clearly overlap with French activity 
around Charlesfort and Fort Caroline, but a broader and deeper analysis of 
conceptions of imperial sovereignty over America could easily be undertaken with 
the same resources and would undoubtedly be very fruitful.
These French and English accounts will be supplemented by those of Spanish 
officials, notorious for their record keeping. Pedro Menendez and Monique de Rojas, 
agents of Spain, produced official documents of their actions in Florida, documents 
intended for their commanders and potentially those even higher up the chain. 
Ribault’s account was published in English, but for Laudonniere, Menendez, and de 
Rojas, I will be using translations. Although this presents challenges in interpretation, 
there are translations that have been widely cited and acknowledged as acceptable, so 
I defer to their expertise in the relevant languages. These Spanish accounts show how 
Spanish officials occasionally lumped France and England together, especially French 
Protestants, as well as their concerns about these settlements. The Spanish perspective 
reveals overarching links between Charlesfort, Fort Caroline, Roanoke, and, to a 
lesser extent, Jamestown and therefore offers an invaluable additional perspective.
In The Jamestown Project, Kupperman claimed that “Laudonniere’s colony 
endured the classic experiences of early colonization: a breakdown of order and 
purpose in the men, who found life in America far different from their expectations; 
the onset of debilitating diseases, which attacked the commander among others; and 
worsening relations with the Timucuans, who resisted pressure to provide the French
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with food.” Charlesfort and Fort Caroline model an apparently common tale. Spain 
had also sponsored attempts to settle in southeastern North America, attempts which 
all failed. According to Bennett, they had decided to abandon such efforts north of 
Mexico.49 Yet their efforts do not have the same romantic arc as the English and 
French efforts; Spain’s dominion of the Americas did not happen easily, but there was 
no doubt in the 1560s that Spain had such dominion. These failures were mere 
missteps. England and France had no toeholds in the Americas and were looking to 
challenge Spain’s authority, a showdown reminiscent of David and Goliath. While 
Spanish imperial actors were present, they worked with a very different set of tools 
and expectations than did the French and, later, the English. Before analyzing the 
narrative similarities and significance of these various colonial efforts, it is helpful to 
analyze the more straightforward ways in which efforts on the Atlantic coast from 
Florida through Virginia resembled each other. Of course, many of these shared goals 
were common among colonial efforts in general. However, as will be discussed later, 
ongoing discussions about sovereignty enacted in these specific spaces as well as the 
seemingly endless connections between the people involved in these early French and 
English efforts serve to further bind them together.
48 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 82.
49 Charles E. Bennett, Introduction, Three Voyages, xvi.
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Chapter 1: Interconnectivity
For all the large and meaningful connections between these various colonial 
attempts, they were also linked in far more straightforward ways: through people and 
through place. From Jamestown in Virginia to Fort Caroline in Florida, these imperial 
outposts clustered along a specific stretch of the Atlantic coast, a stretch that was 
explored by many different groups of Europeans in this era. Perhaps most 
importantly, all of these settlement attempts were positioned to have easy access to 
the Gulf Stream and Spanish sailing routes. The role of privateering will be discussed 
more in depth in the following pages, but this geographical proximity to Spain’s 
treasure fleet was no accident. Although there were fewer Europeans in North 
America than in later years, this concentration of attention along the coast of 
southeastern North America led to many interesting encounters. Various Native 
American groups repeatedly encountered men from Spain, France, and England, and 
likely used collected knowledge of these men and their goals in their interactions with 
official imperial representatives. Men such as Guillaume Rouffin got caught up in a 
variety of imperial projects because of their knowledge of the area and of the people, 
knowledge that was highly prized. Groups of Europeans repeatedly encountered or 
narrowly missed each other, such as when Laudonniere’s fleet sailing to Florida in 
1564 just missed the Spanish expedition sent to find and destroy what remained of 
Charlesfort on their return to Cuba.50
50 Eugene Lyon, “The Captives o f Florida” in The Florida Historical Quarterly 50 (Jul.,
1971) 1-24. Accessed February 3, 2015. http://wwwistor.org/stable/30140435. 3.
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The gales that are still common along this coast affected the outcomes of 
multiple missions. Just as Ribaulf s fleet was driven to sea by a hurricane, giving the 
Spanish the upper hand, John White’s attempt to return to Roanoke in 1590 was 
thwarted by a similar storm. Multiple sources mention a large number of Spanish 
shipwrecks along this coast, and Laudonniere encountered some survivors of just 
such an event living under the king of Calos, in what is now southern Florida. These 
men reported that the king they had lived under possessed great wealth, “enough gold 
and silver.. .to full to the brim a hole to the height of a man and as wide as a barrel” 
and that “the greatest part of these riches came out of Spanish ships which went down 
in these straits.” This king reportedly sacrificed a Spaniard every year at harvest time, 
apparently unconcerned about a lack of supply.51 Shipwrecks were common on this 
coast, leading to a well-recorded, if vague, population of “lost” Europeans years 
before Roanoke. These shipwrecks became romanticized tales in Europe with even 
Shakespeare penning a play inspired by the shipwrecks on the 1609 voyage to 
Jamestown; The Tempest. While most of the French settlers from Charlesfort and 
Fort Caroline are accounted for in the sources, Kupperman notes that the members of 
the “lost colony” of Roanoke “were only a fraction of the many people from abroad 
who melted into native populations in eastern North America.”53
These events shared more than geography, as many figures overlap in the 
stories of Charlesfort, Fort Caroline, Roanoke, and Jamestown. Some of the more 
obvious connections have been mentioned, such as the fact that Hakluyt dedicated a
51 Laudonniere, Three Voyages, 109-111.
52 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 249.
53 Ibid, 99.
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translation of Laudonniere’s account to Ralegh in the midst of the Roanoke voyages. 
Kupperman discusses this era of young men seeing opportunities for advancement all 
over the world, and how many men in the sixteenth century “ventured out to seek 
glory and status. In the process they sometimes caused havoc both for their own 
country and for others.”54 Sir Walter Ralegh and John Smith are archetypal examples 
of these adventurers, men who made their names through daring acts of exploration 
and leadership. Imperial officials pushed colonial efforts, but one cannot deny the 
impact of these gutsy men of fortune, many of whom have remained heroic figures in 
American legends from that time to the present.
As a sole figure, Francis Drake strikingly appears in both the French and 
English colonial attempts in the second half of the sixteenth century. In summer of 
1564, Laudonniere and his men were preparing to leave. After suffering starvation 
and continued tension with the Timucuans, they were preparing to leave their post 
when they saw sails; ’’they were so overjoyed that they laughed and jumped around as 
if they were out of their minds.”55 These sails belonged to English mariner and 
privateer John Hawkins, returning from a slave-trading voyage. He sailed along the 
Florida coast looking for water and, at some point, Hawkins decided to search out the 
French fort he had heard about. According to Laudonniere’s account, as well as the 
account by a John Sparke who sailed with Hawkins, a Frenchman aboard Hawkins’ 
vessel had sailed with Laudonniere in 1562 and helped the English find the River 
May. Sparke recalled the mutinies in Fort Caroline as well as the privation the men 
there had endured, and claimed that “God sent us thither for their succuor” and
54 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 44.
55 Laudonniere, Three Voyages, 141.
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Hawkins “spared them out of his ship twenty barrels of meale.. .with divers other 
victuals and necessaries which he might conveniently spare: and to helpe them the 
better homewards, whither they were bound before our comming.”56 Drake was 
Hawkins’s second cousin and sailed on this voyage, likely witnessing the French 
desperation, as well as their refusal to sail with Hawkins despite the offer 
Laudonniere records.57 Decades later, Drake arrived at Roanoke after raiding St. 
Augustine, the settlement established to destroy Fort Caroline. Seeing the unhappy 
state of the English there, Drake then took the despondent settlers back to England, as
• coHawkins had offered to Laudonniere.
Sir William Stukeley was another of these daring men, a man who achieved 
notoriety in his own day that has not entirely lasted to the present. When Ribault, and 
Laudonniere with him, returned from Charlesfort to gather reinforcements, they found 
their country split by the first in a series of religious civil wars. Ribault went to
56 John Sparke, “The Voyage made by M. John Hawkins Esquire, and afterward knight, 
Captaine o f the Jesus o f Lubek, one o f her Majesties shippes, and Generali o f the Saloman, 
and other two barkes going in his companie to the coast of Guinea, and the Indies of Nova 
Hispania, begun in An. Dom. 1564” in Hakluyt’s Voyages: The Principal Navigations 
Voyages Traffiques & Discoveries o f  the English Nation, Made by Sea or Over-land to the 
Remote and Farthest Distant Quarters o f  the Earth at any time within the compasse o f  these 
1600 Yeeres by Richard Hakluyt Preacher, and sometimes Student o f  Christ Church in 
Oxford ed. Irwin R. Blacker (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), 154.
57 Laudonniere, Three Voyages, 143-144.
58 Kupperman discusses another lost group at Roanoke: when Drake landed there and ended 
up taking the English settlers home, he left behind several hundred men and women he had 
picked up in the Caribbean; “These, who had apparently been promised their freedom, were 
enslaved Africans, natives o f South America, and galley slaves, whose number included some 
Europeans as well as many identified as Moors. Drake’s intention was to leave some of these 
people in Roanoke to strengthen the settlement, and he had promised to return the Moors and 
Europeans to their own countries.” However, these people disappear from the record when 
Drake picks up the English settlers and they likely remained on the Outer Banks. Kupperman, 
The Jamestown Project, 96-97. This discussion also indicates a racial element in the long­
standing American obsession with the lost Roanoke colonists, especially Virginia Dare, the 
first English child bom in America.
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England, both to escape fighting and to, hopefully, gather support for a relief mission. 
He did manage to gamer support for an Anglo-French effort to relieve Charlesfort, 
with funds raised by Queen Elizabeth. Stukeley took over this venture, re-naming all 
five ships after his own family.59 Rumors had Stukeley as some sort of double agent 
and it seems he was feeding information to the Spanish ambassador in London, a man 
who distmsted Stukeley and assumed he was “bent rather on committing some great 
robbery than discovering new lands,” while turning to complain to the British 
government of this support to a French presence in lands claimed by Spain.60 Once in 
full command of his fleet, Stukeley did not sail for North America. Instead, he went 
to privateer in wars off the coast of Spain. When the men at Charlesfort did 
eventually decide to abandon their post, it was one of Stukeley’s ships that picked 
them up floating near the English coast. A sailor from Stukeley’s fleet had sailed on 
the voyage to Charlesfort and recognized the survivors.61 That coincidence seems 
almost scripted, involving men from different countries encountering each other in 
the Atlantic, yet the accounts of early colonization are riddled with such tales. 
Stukeley was able to avoid punishment for acting against orders due, in part, to the
♦ • fOzealous intervention of his cousin, Sir Humphrey Gilbert. Such events make these 
attempts seem less like heroic attempts to push into the wilderness and more like the 
impossibly tangled series of shifting alliances, goals, and characters that they were.
France and England sought to establish a presence on this coast, in part, to
59 The ships became the Anne Stucley, Thomas Stucley, William Stucley, Trenite Stucley, 
and Fortune Stucley. Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 46.




undercut Spanish authority over the area. The locations each leader chose along the 
Atlantic coast granted easy access to the Caribbean, as well as the route the Spanish 
treasure fleet regularly sailed across the Atlantic. The Spanish frequently accused 
other Europeans of privateering, raiding their ships either with or without the 
permission of rival governments. In 1562, years before commanding the destruction 
of whatever remained of Charlesfort, Philip II of Spain told the captain-general of his 
Indies fleet, Pedro Menendez de Aviles, that “along the Indies sailing routes of some 
French, English and Scotch corsair ships, seeking to steal what comes and goes from 
there...these corsairs should, by rights, be hung as peace-breakers and robbers” and 
ordered him “to proceed against them and punish them in conformity with justice, 
executing it then upon the sea with all rigor.”63 In their accounts, neither Ribault nor 
Laudonniere explicitly mentioned privateering as a goal. Laudonniere discussed the 
raiding done by the men who mutinied against him and took ships to plunder the 
Spanish near Cuba, but took great pains to separate himself from their actions. He 
wrote that when these men asked to sail to Spanish lands to attempt to get much- 
needed food, he “feared that under the pretext of searching for food they would 
undertake some enterprise against subjects of the king of Spain, something that might 
be properly laid at my feet, considering that on our departure from France the Queen 
had expressly commanded me to do no wrong against the subjects of the king of 
Spain nor anything by which he might conceive any unhappiness.”64 This passage 
reveals the interesting position of French officials, who seem to have offered tacit 
support to Laudonniere while simultaneously trying to avoid angering the Spanish.
63 Quoted in Lyon, “The Captives o f Florida,” 2.
64 Laudonniere, Three Voyages, 98-99.
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But, more significantly, this passage shows Laudonniere trying to address and deflect 
rumors that Fort Caroline was intended as a base for piracy.
Spanish accounts challenged Laudonniere’s attempt to deny such charges. In 
1564, Manrique de Rojas received orders to sail from Havana up the Florida coast to 
find, record, and destroy any markers of the French presence. His report extensively 
detailed his journey including an encounter with Guillaume Rouffin. Rouffin had 
been a teenager at Charlesfort and chose to remain behind rather than sail across the 
Atlantic on a makeshift vessel with no experienced navigator. The Spanish found him 
living among the Guale, and with that experience he became a valued interpreter 
between the Spanish and native groups. When de Rojas first met Rouffin, he pressed 
him for information about the French presence and intent at Charlesfort. According to 
de Rojas, Rouffin explained that the expedition “came directly to this coast of 
Florida.. .to discover whether it was a good location for going out into the Bahama 
Channel to capture the fleets from the Indies. This he knows because he heard it said 
by everyone and it was common knowledge.”65 The Spanish already believed that this 
was the French goal, but Rouffin confirmed those fears. This evidence also suggested 
that Ribault and Laudonniere may have carefully left this purpose out of their 
accounts while discussing their privateering plans with their men. In this light, 
Laudonniere’s stringent denials of wrongdoing could be read as a deliberate 
performance that many French officials, and perhaps French citizens, would know 
better than to believe.
65 Hernando Manrique de Rojas, “The Report o f Manrique de Rojas,” in Laudonniere & Fort 
Caroline: History and Documents, ed. Charles E. Bennett (Gainesville, FL: University of 
Florida Press, 1964), 122.
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Composed the next year, Menendez’s report covers the Spanish attack on Fort 
Caroline, a raid he was commanded to make. He succinctly explained Spanish 
concerns regarding the French attempt: “if.. .the English, French, or any other nation 
should feel disposed to go and settle any part of Florida, it would be very damaging to 
these kingdoms, because on said coast of Florida and in said strait of the Bahamas, 
they could settle and fortify themselves in such a way, that they could have galleons 
and vessels of war to capture the fleets and other private vessels that come from the 
Indies.”66 As far as Spanish officials were concerned, it mattered little which rival 
power sought to establish forts on this coast. Any such attempt would carry the same 
risk. As expressed in the 1562 commands from Phillip II, any foreign European 
presence in these waters was seen as robbery and piracy and something to be crushed. 
Considering how much wealth Spanish ships regularly transported on this sea route, 
this concern made sense. It is almost inconceivable that French and English officials 
would not have considered this incredible boon when choosing the site of future 
colonial attempts, and this may well be the reason that Charlesfort, Fort Caroline, 
Roanoke, and - to a lesser extent - Jamestown gathered along the same southern 
stretch of the Atlantic coast.
In his collection of documents related to the Roanoke voyages, David Beers 
Quinn explained the discussions occurring in England in 1585. According to Quinn, 
officials were planning a series of moves against Spain, including establishing a fort 
to use as a base for privateering and launching Sir Francis Drake’s expedition to the
66 Menendez de Aviles, Pedro, “Menendez and Fort Caroline” in Laudonniere and Fort 
Caroline: History and Documents, edited by Charles E. Bennett, 125-139 (Tuscaloosa, AL: 
University o f Alabama Press, 2001), 128.
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Americas.67 Drake, a notorious privateer, was a well-known enemy to the Spanish 
and this expedition would consist of raids on Spanish ships and holdings. A letter 
from Richard Hakluyt to Sir Francis Walsingham, included in Quinn’s collection, 
stated in a postscript that “the rumor of Sir Walter Rawles fleet, and especially the 
preparation of Sir Francis Drake doth soe much vexe the Spaniard.. .therefore I cold 
wish that although Sir Frances Drakes iouney be stayed yet the rymor of his setting 
forward might be continued.”68 Hakluyt wrote this from France, referring to the 
Spanish ambassador there, Bernardino de Mendoza. He knew the threats such 
expeditions represented to Spanish interests and desired, at bare minimum, to 
circulate such rumors and make their rivals nervous. Ribault and Laudonniere must 
have been similarly aware of the Spanish concerns their voyages would stir. Spanish 
officials understandably viewed all of these efforts as a similar threat, as it perhaps 
does not matter so much which enemy takes your gold. When Spanish officials heard 
of an English presence on the Carolina coast, a fleet sailed from sailed from Saint 
Augustine to look for an English fort. However, this mission only searched the same 
parts of the coast the French had traveled when they settled Charlesfort, missing 
Roanoke by three hundred miles.69 Spanish officials continually linked English and 
French efforts in Florida, even when this assumption worked against them.
More than material gains, rival imperial powers sought information of Florida.
67 Quinn, “The First Colony: Lane and Drake, 1585-6” in The Roanoke Voyages 1584-1590: 
Documents to Illustrate the English Voyages to North America Under the Patent Granted to 
Walter Ralegh, Volume 1 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1991) 250.
68 Hakluyt, “7 April 1585. Richard Hakluyt to Sir Francis Walsingham” in The Roanoke 
Voyages 1584-1590: Documents to Illustrate the English Voyages to North America, 155.
69 David Beers Quinn, “Spain and the Roanoke Voyages, 1584-8 in The Roanoke Voyages 
1584-1590, Volume II, 720.
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France and England both lagged behind Spain in terms of exploration and
colonization. France had sponsored voyages, including that of Jacques Cartier and
Giovanni da Verrazano under Francis I and had collected some knowledge about the
Americas. Yet there was still no reliable European map of the Americas by 1568.70
Hakluyt devoted his career to spreading information to boost English imperial efforts,
and he did this by never travelling further than Paris. He believed that translating and
furthering the information was just as valuable as gathering it. Information about the
Americas was hugely powerful and necessary if European powers wished to remain
competitive. In their haste to collect information, officials often overlooked serious
questions of accuracy. John Hawkins, an English sailor and privateer, left a hundred
sailors in Mexico in 1568 (at their own request). Three of these men were later picked
up on the east coast in Acadia and one, David Ingram, was interviewed by Hakluyt.
According to Mancall, this account had so many flaws that contemporaries saw it as
“riddled with fantasy,” yet, “before his account was called into question, his
testimony was sought by the highest authorities in England.”71 Information was so
valuable that even the mighty leapt after it without seeking a prudent pause.
Ribault began his account of Florida with a statement of purpose, similar to
many others prefacing many similar accounts. He wrote that in 1562, “It pleased God
to move your Grace [Admiral Coligny]” to send Ribault and his men to Florida:
To the ende that we might certifie you and make true reports of 
the temperature, fertilitie, portes, havens, rivers, and generally 
of all the commodities that might be founde and seen in that 
lande, and also to learn what people were there dwelling, which 
thing long tyme agon ye have desiered.. .that France might one
70 Mancall, Hakluyt’s Promise, 22.
71 Ibid, 155.
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daye thoruhg newe discover[ie]s have knowledge of strange 
conteries, and also thereof to receave, by means of contynewell 
trafficque, riche and inestimable comodoties, as other nations 
have don.72
This expedition was, then, primarily a fact-finding mission. Ribault was intent on 
gathering knowledge that might further long-term settlement, such as the fertility of 
the land, as well as knowledge of “inestimable comodoties” that might allow France 
to increase its wealth and challenge Spain. Knowledge could not be separated from 
riches, in this and other accounts, as one could not compete to control a territory 
without knowing at least as much about it as your enemy. Therefore, such expeditions 
to the Americas became foundations for later authority.
Presenting the same expedition several years later, Laudonniere discussed 
Ribault’s main concerns from an alternate perspective. After exploring the coast from 
the River of May (future sight of Fort Caroline) to Port Royal, Ribault selected a 
group of men to stay behind, and then debated whether he should continue to explore 
or return to France. As Laudonniere reported, “Some said that he had reason to be 
content in view of the fact that he could do nothing more, reminding him that he had 
explored in six weeks more than the Spanish had done in two years in their New 
Spain, and that it would be the greatest service that could be done to the king if he 
would promptly return with news of his happy discoveries.” Even several years 
removed from this debate, Laudonniere noted both that they had trumped the Spanish 
in exploring this territory and that reporting the information they gathered was 
incredibly important, as well as time-sensitive. This brief comment, seemingly an
72 Ribault, The whole & true discouerye o f  Terra Florida, 53-54. Biggar assumes that the lord 
referenced in this opening is Coligny, and I have gone with that assumption.
73 Laudonniere, Three Voyages, 37.
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aside, reveals both a pervasive sense of rivalry as well as a general awareness of why 
these kinds of expeditions mattered and why kings ordered them in the first place. 
Exploring and charting the land, especially the coast, had another useful purpose: 
mapping and naming the land meant one had power over it. Using the example of the 
French in Florida, Benton discusses how the rivers the French praised and named 
were seen as “possible avenues to rumored mines, wealtheier Indians, and valuable 
trade,” and by charting and giving these rivers French names, Ribault claimed 
authority over them.74
Hakluyt based his career on the English need to have information about the 
Americas, especially as they would not gather it themselves. He believed that was an 
essential way to support the furthering of Protestantism across the globe as well as 
bolster England as a nation. As Mancall explains it, after realizing as a young man 
what his life’s work should be, Hakluyt “tried to turn his obsession with America, 
nurtured during his student days, into a passion that would consume his nation.”75 
Mancall also theorized that Hakluyt published his translation of Laudonniere’s 
account during a gap in the expected information from Roanoke. In the preface to this 
translation, Hakluyt dedicated the work to Sir Walter Ralegh. He noted the apparent 
uselessness of this translation, as Ralegh had spent time in France and therefore could 
have easily read the original account. Yet, though he dedicated the work to Ralegh, 
Hakluyt had another audience in mind. He explained, ostensibly to Ralegh, that this 
English translation should be directed to the men “which are to be employed in your
74 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 46.
75 Mancall, Hakluyt’s Promise, 22.
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owne like enterprise.”76 This translation, then, was for Ralegh’s men or sponsors who 
would benefit from having the knowledge the French had gathered of this land, as 
well as knowledge of the mistakes that had ruined the French effort. However, 
Hakluyt’s career, as well as the general publication of this translation, suggests a far 
larger audience: the English public. Mancall argues this publication was an effort to 
generate positive spin. Through framing Laudonniere’s account as instructional, 
Hakluyt changed the mistakes and misfortunes into learning opportunities and recast 
the failed French attempt as a net positive for the English. Hakluyt had a keen 
awareness of the necessity of both public and official support for imperial efforts, and 
he used the information Laudonniere had gathered through exploration and trial and 
error to support his ultimate goal of English colonization of the Americas.
Information about the Americas, as invaluable as it was, too often came to 
officials very slowly or full of inaccuracies. Spanish officials were not able to 
investigate tales of a French presence at Fort Royal until 1564 when the French 
voyage to re-establish a presence in Florida was already underway. In May 1565, the 
English minister at Madrid, William Phayre, wrote to William Cecil, a chief advisor 
of Queen Elizabeth I. He discussed the Spanish expedition under Pedro Melendez 
headed to Florida to dislodge Villegaignon.77 Nicolas Durand de Villegaignon, 
another prominent Huguenot naval officer, had led a French expedition to what is 
now Brazil to establish Antarctic France in 1555. This colonial effort was larger than
76 Laudonniere, Hakluyt translation, Preface, [1].
77 William Phayre to Cecil, 12 May 1565, SP 70/78 f.41a, The National Archives o f the UK. 




either Charlesfort or Fort Caroline, including around 600 men, many of them 
prisoners.78 He returned to France in 1558 to participate in ongoing religious debates 
and the Portuguese destroyed the French fort in 1560. Somehow, English officials 
believed that Villegaignon also commanded the French in Florida, repeatedly citing 
his presence there in their letters. They were clearly operating off of faulty or 
outdated information. The presence of these unclear stories in diplomatic 
correspondence suggests the value of information about imperial activity in the 
Americas. Yet, despite discussing such information and expending effort to 
understand what was happening, Phayre used a name at least ten years and a 
continental shift out of date. In June of that same year, a Robert Hogan wrote to 
Robert Dudley, another key advisor of Queen Elizabeth’s, of more of Villegaignon’s 
supposed misadventures in Florida. Hogan had received “woorde that Villegailgon 
and all hys company of the Frenchmen that had taken Terry Floryda are kyllted and 
eaten [by] the people of the sayd Islands.”79 Men from Charlesfort trying to return to 
France had killed and eaten one of their comrades, but this kind of large-scale 
cannibalism does not appear in other records. And, again, Villegaignon shows up in 
these colonial ventures, but in the wrong decade and on the wrong continent. English 
officials were clearly on the lookout for information relevant to these French
78 Boucher discusses Antarctic France in France and the American Tropics to 1700, 44-49. 
While a fascinating story in its own right, this expedition is less connected to English and 
Spanish efforts in the Americas as it involved territory claimed by Portugal. As such, this 
expedition does not fit into the scope o f this essay, but analysis remains to be done on how 
this expedition may have affected French (and other) actions in North America.
79 Robert Hogan to the Earl o f Leicester, 30 June 1565, SP 70/78 f.214, The National 




attempts. It is unclear who mixed up the names, the English writers, their sources, or 
someone else, but clearly those in Europe did not have a clear and up-to-date idea of 
activities in the Americas. Given these examples, one can see how invaluable 
accurate and timely information would be, especially if imperial officials wanted to 
take action to counteract or prevent any gains made by their rivals.
These more recognizable connections, those of places and of people, show 
undeniable links between French and English imperial efforts in the mid-to-late 
sixteenth century. Historians cannot know exactly what those involved in these efforts 
knew about all of these connections, or what they thought if they knew. Men like 
Drake and Stukeley perfectly exemplify the shifting intricacies of imperial plans, 
hinting at deeper shared patterns between the French and English efforts discussed 
here. Charlesfort, Fort Caroline, Roanoke, and Jamestown shared more than 
geography, more than characters. These events followed similar narrative patterns, 
establishing what Kupperman calls the classic tale of early colonization in America. 
More than that, accounts from these expeditions provide excellent examples of 
imperial agents keenly aware that “sovereignty was not a given...but would depend on
O A
recurring proofs.” The accounts of the French actions at Charlesfort and Fort 
Caroline reveal actors deeply concerned with an enacted loyalty to their sovereigns 
and others’ view of that loyalty, as well as the necessity to enact sovereignty in ways 
that would clearly convey the validity of French claims to Florida. Spain saw all 
privateering attempts as piracy, a direct challenge to their proclaimed authority. 
Through looking at these French and English imperial efforts together, as well as
80 Benton, A Search For Sovereignty, 23.
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considering how each sought to position themselves in respect to Spain, a shared 
language of proof comes into view, a language based on common understandings of 
the value of history, the importance of physical symbols, and the role of beneficial 
interactions with Native Americans in validating European claims.
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Chapter 2: Symbolic Language and Shifting Alliances
In a review The French in Early Florida: In the Eye o f the Hurricane by John 
T. McGrath, Philip Boucher characterized Spanish control of the American southeast 
as “bombastic but hollow.”81 While this was perhaps not intended as a serious 
analysis, it gets to the heart of the issue. France, Spain, and, later, England wanted to 
control this land and, at different points, claimed that they did. Yet each often 
possessed very little actual power in the areas in question, as demonstrated by the 
ways in which their expeditions and colonization attempts tended towards disaster. 
These claims of authority were, then, in many ways, “hollow.” Yet each symbolic 
move carried great weight to those who enacted them, their intended audience, and 
the people whose lives were affected in very visceral ways by these actions. Using 
Lauren Benton’s concept of “legal posturing” as a starting point, one can decipher the 
symbolic language used by various European officials to attempt to communicate 
their authority to other Europeans, attempts that sought to turn perceived authority 
into effective power.
Spain claimed dominion over Florida, yet did not act on the French presence 
at Charlesfort until after the settlement had been abandoned. Due to slow 
communication across the Atlantic, such knowledge delays were inevitable. Yet this 
reality lent a certain farcical feel to some of the expeditions. Hernando Manrique de 
Rojas was sent from Cuba to investigate and end the French venture at Port Royal, the
81 Philip Boucher, “John T. McGrath, The French in Early Florida: In the Eye o f  the 
Hurricane,” review in The International History Review 23 (Dec., 2001): 896, accessed 
November 15, 2011. http://www.istor.org/stable/40108852.
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location of Charlesfort. Yet, by the time he arrived, the only Frenchman in the area 
was Rouffin, the young man who stayed with the local Native Americas. According 
the de Rojas’s report, “it is about fourteen months since [the Frenchmen] went away
o 9
and no news of them has been received.” The officials were acting out a large drama 
on a large area of land, yet the Europeans present were few and far between, and, in 
the case of Rouffin, young and relatively unimportant. The Spanish carried Rouffin 
down the coast towards Havana just as Laudonniere’s ships sailed up it, exploring the 
coastline before deciding to settle at the River May.83 When the Spanish wanted to 
find and quash English attempts in Florida, they stuck to exploring the harbors used 
by the French, as discussed above. The fleet that Laudonniere commanded almost 
sailed to Florida as a rescue mission, only learning that Charlesfort survivors had 
returned to Europe roughly a month before their departure, while the relief voyage to 
Roanoke completely missed those they intended to relieve. Knowledge of others’ 
actions was usually out-of-date and attempts to act upon it did not always end well. 
This constructs an image of theoretical, more than actual, claims of control over these 
areas on all sides. Rhetoric and legal claims loomed large, but the realities involved a 
lot more chance and confusion than systematic expansion of power.
When putting down stakes, European leaders usually worried about 
defensibility of an area. Yet, while keeping watch for enemy ships on the horizon, 
Charlesfort, Fort Caroline, Roanoke, and Jamestown were all undone by another 
threat: they were starving. Charlesfort serves as an effective example of what 
Kupperman called “the classic experiences of early colonization,” including an over­
82 de Rojas, “The Report o f Manrique de Rojas,” 120.
83 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 79-80.
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reliance on Native Americans for food.84 With no plans for producing their own food, 
Laudonniere and his men relied on reinforcements from France or trade with the 
Timucuans, the Native Americans in the area. When reinforcements from France did 
not arrive when expected, the French position weakened further. In 1563, Ribault 
wrote “the living God hathe reserved this greate lande for the Kinges poore subjectes, 
aswell to then ende they might be made great over this pooer people and rude 
nation.” According to him, God intended the French to have dominion over the land 
and the “pooer people” who lived there. Yet, by 1565, Fort Caroline was desperate 
for food. They needed the Timucuans to trade with them and, according to 
Laudonniere, the Timucuans used this to their advantage, for “knowing our exceeding 
strange famin, sold us at so deere a price that for lesse then nothing they had gotten 
[from] us all the rest of our marchandise.. .our poore soldiers were constrained to go, 
& oftentimes (as I have seen) to give away the very shirtes from their backes to get 
one fish. Here, the French appear more as beggars than rulers. Their plan of control 
and dominion, over both the land and the people, did not bear up when those hoping 
to be in charge could neither feed themselves off the land nor readily convince the 
people they claimed to rule to supply what they needed.
John Smith illustrates another example of European powerlessness in his 
account of Jamestown. In his writings, he discussed the merciful presence of Chief 
Powhatan’s young daughter who Smith referred to as Pocahontas. According to 
Smith, this young girl prevailed upon her father to provide food to the hungry
84 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 82.
85 Ribault, The whole & true discouerye o f  Terra Florida, 56.
86 Laudonniere, A notable historie, 43.
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colonists at Jamestown. After the infamous incident in which he claims Pocahontas 
saved his life, Pocahontas made sure that he was “safely conducted to James towne, 
whre I found about eight and thirtie miserable poore and sicke creatures, to keepe 
possession of all those large territories of Virginia, such was the weaknesse of this 
poore Common-welath, as had the Salvages not ged us, we directly had starved.”87 
These men were not glorious conquerors, but pathetic starved individuals who 
desperately needed help. Smith wrote this account, in part, to boost his own 
reputation, and therefore stood to benefit from portraying the men under his 
command as useless. However, he also seemed to recognize the irony in such a 
pathetic group of men keeping “possession of all those large territories,” so this 
passage suggests that he readily acknowledged that the future of English dominion 
depended, at least in this moment, entirely on the goodwill of others. Smith, at this 
point in his own narrative, wielded no power and owed his life entirely to Pocahontas, 
her sway over her father, and the support the Powhatans offered.
European sovereignty over southeastern North America was a patchwork, a 
series of small strings, using Benton’s metaphor. Imperial sovereignty did not match 
lived experience, and words did not match actions or realities. Yet the imperial 
powers, and specifically their agents, did not act as if this were true. What may appear 
to modem scholars as empty, or even foolish, rhetoric of control had very real 
meanings to those who spoke, wrote, or marched under such orders and ideas. While 
Europeans competed for power and tried to demonstrate control, Benton argues that
87 John Smith, Captain John Smith: A Select Edition o f His Writings, ed. Karen Ordahl 
Kupperman (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1988), 69.
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they “drew on a shared repertoire of Roman law” and geographic tropes. Imperial 
actors relied on such legal practices and shared knowledge “to project sovereignty 
into those spaces,” and actors in these Florida settlement attempts used that shared
O Q
European language to attempt to convince others of their sovereignty. Elements of 
this shared language included a sense of history, common assumptions about 
geography and strategy, and rhetoric of helping the Native Americans. Accounts of 
colonization, then, reveal the use of these strategic languages to communicate with 
other Europeans and how this communication was part of a developing language and 
law around colonial possession.
In their attempts to enact authority and create a language of imperial 
possession that their rivals would understand, European powers heavily referenced 
the Roman empire. To sixteenth-century Europeans, evoking the Romans meant 
invoking the rule of law, civility, and the people who spread such civilization across 
the world. Anthony Pagden has studied this and claims that Rome “provided the 
ideologues of the colonial systems of Spain, Britain, and France with the language 
and political models they required” and, perhaps most significantly, “conferred an 
ethical purpose upon the entire community.”90 Pagden argues that Rome’s greatest 
export was its law and that it was a civilization designed for dissemination. In 
evoking Rome, then, European powers expressed their desire to have a similar 
civilizing influence across the globe. In his preface, Laudonniere argued that the 
motivations for most exploration and settlement can be reduced to desire for the
88 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 8.
89 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, xi.
90 Anthony Pagden, Lords o f  All the World: Ideologies o f Empire in Spain, Britain and 
France c. 1500 -  c. 1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 11, 19.
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resources for a better life, and desire to find a place to send the surplus population. 
But, he noted, “the Romans added another to these two principal reasons for foreign 
settlement. They were anxious to establish their laws, customs, and religion in the 
areas which they conquered.”91 This also connected to a much larger claim that will 
be discussed in the pages to follow: the benefit of exporting religion to the Native 
Americans. Here Laudonniere very consciously framed himself and these French 
expeditions as part of this grand tradition, confirming that this was an effort to better 
both France and the world. While English and Spanish explorers would likely have 
disagreed about who should be leading such a grand mission, they would have 
recognized the desire to emulate Rome and, in doing so, provide better opportunities 
for themselves and their countrymen.
The language of Rome also gave imperial powers a way to explain or 
challenge claims. When Spain claimed Florida and the Caribbean, they did so on the 
authority of the Treaty of Tordesillas, a document based on papal bulls and reinforced 
by papal approval. However, others, including the English, French, and Dutch, 
challenged this religious decree with an ancient Roman legal concept. They argued 
res nullius: land could not be claimed unless it was occupied or held by whoever put 
forth the claim.92 The Europeans did not consider the original inhabitants of the 
Americas to be using the land enough to count, so the land remained to be claimed by 
whoever established a presence and fortified or farmed it in a way fellow Europeans 
would recognize. This explains the French and English desire to place outposts at 
strategic geographic points, especially points that allow one to control the rivers
91 Laudonniere, Three Voyages, 4.
92 This concept is discussed in Pagden, Lords o f  All the World, 10-20.
49
flowing to the interior of the continent. Through establishing a presence at the 
opening of a corridor, Europeans could argue the entire corridor was effectively 
claimed. However, without at least one fort or group of men on the ground, these 
claims could be refuted. When the Spanish learned of a French presence at Port 
Royal, they sent an expedition to find and destroy any remaining physical evidence of 
a French presence at Charlesfort. This episode will be discussed more in the 
following pages, but it shows how a physical presence in the place could be a 
powerful symbol of authority. The Spanish expended significant effort trying to 
remove evidence from the landscape that anyone other than them had had even a 
temporary presence in the region.
Perhaps building off of this idea, Europeans frequently cast back for historical 
stories and legends of their people in the Americas to establish a presence and 
therefore claim these contested spaces. History provided not only models for imperial 
sovereignty but also stories that could be used to establish claims of sovereignty. If a 
French or English expedition had sailed a coast first, had been the first European 
group to record observations and make use of an area, it rightly belonged to the 
country that sponsored the original voyage. Kupperman characterized British claims 
to North America as vague, based on the legend of a medieval Welsh prince who 
sailed to the Americas, “Madoc ap Owen Gweyneth,” as Hakluyt wrote it. According 
to the legend, as recorded by Hakluyt, this prince left his country to avoid ongoing 
internal strife around 1170, sailed to the Americas, and then returned to Wales to 
gather colonists with whom he sailed back west. This was proven in “very auncient
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and auctenticall Chronicles written in the welshe or brittish tongue.”93 The Virginia 
Company claimed settlement rights on this basis, and colonists at Jamestown believed 
they had found people who spoke a language derived from Welsh. One man who 
spoke Welsh even attempted to serve as a translator, with presumably little success.94 
This evocation of a hazy medieval legend may seem ridiculous to a modem reader, 
but it clearly carried weight to contemporary Englishmen as they repeatedly 
referenced this tale. Of course, one could debate the extent to which the Virginia 
Company actually believed this legend, but regardless of sincerity, it served as a 
foundation for ongoing attempts at colonization.
The French based their claim to sovereignty on the expeditions of Jacques 
Cartier and, especially, Giovanni Verrazano, both sponsored by Francis I. In his 
account, Laudonniere divided the Americas into New France, New Spain, and Pem. 
New France is so-called “because even as early as 1524 Jean Verrazano, a Florentine, 
was sent to these new lands by Francis I ... He landed there and explored the entire 
coast.. .he placed the flag there and the coat-of-arms of the king of France, so that 
even the Spanish when they came afterwards called the country French.”95 As evident 
by later Spanish actions, they did not agree with this claim. However, Laudonniere 
frames this voyage here as definitive. French flags were the first to fly here, therefore 
the land is and shall be French. Bennett argued that this claim to New France, the 
southern part of which was Florida, was “equally as good if not more valid than that
93 Richard Hakluyt quoted in Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 74.
94 These Welsh-speakers were actually the Siouan-speaking Monacans. Kupperman, The 
Jamestown Project, 74.
95 Laudonniere, Three Voyages, 6-7.
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of Spain.”96
The French placed huge importance on the placement of a flag in 1524, so it 
follows they would continue to place more markers of their presence on the landscape 
to further establish their claim. Early in their exploration of the east coast of North 
America, Ribault and some of his men went ashore, “earring with us a piller or 
colume of hard stone, our kinges armes graven therin, to plaint and sett.. .at the entrye
0 Hof the porte in some high place wher it might be easelly sene.” This first column 
was near the mouth of what is now the St. Johns River, or what they named the River 
May, and near where Laudonniere would later establish Fort Caroline. Ribault’s 
expedition planted a second column near the site of Charlesfort, “in a comoduus 
pleasaunt and high place, at the entrye of a faire great river.”98 By taking care to plant 
both columns on high grand, Ribault ensured their visibility and seeming domination 
of the landscape. Although these columns were not terribly large, by most accounts, 
their positions on high ground made it clear that they bore significance to be seen 
from afar. Furthermore, Ribault took care to put these markers in pleasant places, 
places he explicitly described as rich in natural resources, places France would want 
to control and populate. Also, by placing the columns at the mouths of rivers and 
entries of ports, Ribault claimed dominion over not just the coastline, but also the 
rivers themselves, and the land that might be accessed through them. In a time when 
many believed such rivers may lead to passages to the riches of Asia, these were 
grand and significant claims. Benton explains how rivers could act as “corridors of
96 Bennett, “Exploring Florida with Ribault” in Laudonniere & Fort Caroline: History and 
Documents, 13.
97 Ribault, The whole & true discouerye o f  Terra Florida, 16.
98 Ribault, The whole & true discouerye o f  Terra Florida, 95.
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control,” explaining the importance of claiming the river mouth or harbor." The 
French named all the rivers they passed on this expedition, many for rivers in France, 
including the Sienne, Somme, and Loire. They recognized the significance of 
exploring and naming rivers in establishing sovereignty, and established the columns 
as physical markers of this dominion reinforced by documenting the new names they 
gave the places they claimed.
Spanish officials knew of the columns Ribault planted, and they dedicated 
great energy to getting rid of them. Philip II demanded that the governor of Cuba 
organize an expedition to remove these markers and destroy the French fort. The 
governor sent Manrique de Rojas, whose journey was carefully chronicled by 
“scriveners,” or the ubiquitous Spanish scribes. De Rojas’s specific orders were to 
gather information, but especially to “seek a stone column or marker bearing the arms 
of France.. .Having found it you will remove and destroy it, or, if it proves to be a 
thing that can be transported in the frigate you will bring it with you. This is to be 
done in the presence of witnesses, and of a scrivener.”100 This act needed to be 
witnessed, and the column returned as proof if possible, showing how important these 
seemingly purely symbolic acts were to those in charge of Cuba and other Spanish 
imperial projects. The governor could not trust a mission this important to an official 
account; he needed corroboration and physical evidence. De Rojas was also 
commanded to find the French fort, take prisoner any who remained there, and bring
99 Benton, A Search For Sovereignty, 103. Spanish officials later expressed concern that 
Jamestown, located near a river that went far into the continent, posed a direct threat to 
Mexico. Rivers were both symbolically and practically powerful, and therefore assumed 
much importance in imperial discourse and planning. Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 
155.
100 de Rojas, “The Report o f Manrique de Rojas,”, 109-110.
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them and all of the stores and munitions within the fort back to Cuba. Then, he was to 
“[raze] the fort so completely that not trace of it shall remain.”101 Again, the need to 
return proof, if possible, remained paramount. The insistence on removing every trace 
of the fort is also telling. Although this could have been rhetoric, it shows that the 
goal of Spanish officials was not to render the fort useless or to remove the 
Frenchmen there, but to make it as if the fortification had never existed. They fought 
the French presence on every level, trying to eradicate the French physical presence 
so that future expeditions would not have more history on which to found themselves.
De Rojas’s mission, at first, had trouble locating the columns or the fort. He 
had the scriveners carefully record each landing that resulted in the location of 
neither. Finally, he heard tell of a Frenchman living with Indians in the area and 
found Rouffin. From him, de Rojas learned the location of the fort and one of the 
columns; the one Ribault had placed second, near Charlesfort. De Rojas and his men 
visited the fort. There, they “found nothing at all. Then the captain commanded that 
the building be set on fire and burned, and he ordered me, the scrivener, to certify in 
writing that the house was burned and destroyed. I, the said scrivener, hereby certify
1 0 9and declare that it was burned and destroyed in my presence.” Such thorough 
razing of the fort was a symbolic act and, as such, needed to be observed, recorded, 
and remembered to reach its full impact. Next, de Rojas and his men located the 
column near the site of the fort. “By order of the captain this marker was taken down 
and thrown to the ground. Thereupon the captain in the presence of me, the scrivener, 
had the stone marker put into the boat to be taken to the frigate and carried to the
101 Ibid, 110.
102 de Rojas, “The Report o f Manrique de Rojas,” 122.
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Governor at Havana. This was done and witnessed.”103 By throwing the column upon 
the ground, de Rojas both acknowledged and sought to nullify the symbolic weight 
and respect that the column was intended to convey by the French, a weight that 
troubled the Spanish authorities. Upon his return to Havana, de Rojas presented to the 
governor, “a stone marker bearing the arms of France, the inscription R., and four 
Arabic numerals,” which “the Governor received in the presence of witnesses.”104 In 
performing this ceremony in front of witnesses, de Rojas and his commanders were 
making very clear that the French claim was invalid, and that they, in removing the 
column, had symbolically, and perhaps therefore actually, destroyed it.
When Laudonniere led his second expedition to Florida in 1564, he found the 
first column Ribault had planted, the one at the mouth of the River May that de Rojas 
had missed. Laudonniere described how they found Indians, in his view, worshipping 
this columns; it was “crowned with crownes of Bay,” with baskets of com all around 
its base; how it was “a thing which they made great account of.”105 By including this 
description, Laudonniere reminded his audience that these symbols of French power 
had lasted, even when the actual Frenchmen left. Furthermore, by depicting the 
column as a near-religious object to the Native Americans, Laudonniere justified the 
French presence in the area both through physical markers and through positive 
relationships and deference from the Indians. As historian Patricia Seed interprets this 
moment, it represented native consent to French rule.106 Laudonniere’s account 
repeatedly mentioned Spanish cruelty to Native Americans, while English colonists at
103 Ibid, 123.
104 de Rojas, “The Report o f Manrique de Rojas,” 108.
105 Laudonniere, A notable historie, 20-20b.
106 Seed, Ceremonies o f Possession, 58.
55
Jamestown emphasized how much the Powhatans and others in the area hated the 
Spanish. Europeans often used the perceived consent of the Native Americans to their 
presence as proof that their imperial efforts were more legitimate than those of others, 
especially the supposedly brutal Spanish. Europeans also claimed their presence was 
beneficial to the Native Americans, especially in terms of spreading religion. Religion 
loomed very large as a motivating factor the English and Protestant French 
expeditions in Florida between 1560 and 1610, as well as Spanish officials’ efforts to 
eradicate them.
While religion does not feature hugely in Ribault and Laudonniere’s accounts, 
historians have often assumed it was of the utmost importance to these men. Bennett 
praised how “four hundred years ago Laudonniere and hundreds of his French 
compatriots sought religious freedom on what became the shores of America.”107 He 
wrote from a place of patriotism and pride, hoping to prove that these Huguenots 
should be part of a Protestant American mythology. However, such connections have 
faded from more recent scholarship. In France and the American Tropics, Boucher 
suggests that Huguenots enjoyed enough status in France in 1562 that perhaps a 
religious refuge would not have been sufficient motivation for a journey. In January 
of 1562, Catherine de Medici issued the Edict of Saint-Germain, an edict of limited 
toleration towards Huguenots. This fell apart by March of that year when violence 
erupted at Vassy and the first civil war or First War of Religion began, but Ribault’s 
fleet left France in February. When they departed, coexistence may have seemed 
possible. Ribault also may have wanted to avoid emphasizing his Protestantism as,
107 Bennett, “Preface” in Laudonniere & Fort Caroline, History and Documents.
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even when it was officially tolerated, such beliefs could put his career and his life in 
jeopardy. By 1564, when Laudonniere’s voyage departed, France remained at peace, 
at least officially, and the royal court was in the midst of a tour of the kingdom to 
encourage trust and goodwill. Boucher does concede that in 1564, religious violence 
had increased in France, so perhaps a desire for a haven would be more probable. 
However, he makes clear that this is speculation: the sources remain largely silent on
1 fiRreligious motivation, or the lack thereof, in the French sources. Ribault and 
Laudonniere both fought in religious wars in France after their return from 
Charlesfort and were likely devout men. However, they do not tie their urge to fortify 
French positions to Florida to religion, and modem scholars should hesitate before 
assuming a clear connection. Again, this silence about religion may have been a tactic 
of self-preservation. Yet without clear evidence of a direct religious motivation, 
scholars should be careful about assigning religious goals to these missions especially 
if they do so in an attempt to align these French expeditions more clearly with 
Plymouth and the New England Puritans.
While Ribault and Laudonniere avoided explicit discussion of their Protestant 
beliefs, conversion of the natives was a constant goal in accounts by imperial officials 
at this time.109 Various European leaders often argued that by bringing Christianity, 
especially the right kind of Christianity, and therefore bettering the lives of the 
natives, they deserved to rule an area more than others. Religion appears in Ribault’s 
list of reasons to explore the America’s, yet not explicitly in Laudonniere’s, where he
108 Boucher, France in the American Tropics, 45-48.
109 For an example o f the invocation of this trope, see Ribault, The whole & true discouerye 
o f  Terra Florida, 54-55.
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focuses on more material gains to France.110 Historian Laura Fishman agrees, arguing 
that Laudonniere was motivated more by a desire to fight Spain than by any religious 
conviction.111 Both Laudonniere and Ribault do include stories to emphasize how 
happy the Native Americans were to see them, as well as tales of Spanish cruelty to 
these same people. These French accounts still frame their authors as welcomed and 
wanted by the Native Americans and this would have acted as support for French 
claims to the area. As Pagden writes, an important part of the European love of 
Roman precedent was the idea that, for some people, conquest was beneficial. Cicero 
wrote of “barbarians,” arguing that ruling such people “is just precisely because
119servitude in such men is established for their welfare.” Whether or not French 
accounts explicitly emphasize religion, there is a sense of paternalism and support for 
the notion that the French would be better masters of this land and this people than 
the Spanish.
Ribault hoped for a time when the Native Americans would “have better 
acquaintance of us, and knowe that there is no suche creuelltye in us as in other 
people and nations, of whom they have beyn begilled under coulour of good 
faythe.”113 While not explicit, Ribault knew that this reference would remind his 
readers of rumors of Spanish cruelty to natives, rumors that Laudonniere sought to 
give credence to in his own account. Laudonniere recorded an encounter with an
110 Laudonniere’s main justifications are riches and the possibility o f putting what he 
perceived as a surplus population in France to better use in the Americas. Laudonniere, Three 
Voyages, 3-5.
111 Laura Fishman, “Old World Images Encounter New World Reality: Rene Laudonniere 
and the Timucuans o f Florida,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 26, No. 3 (Autumn 1995): 
547-559, accessed September 21, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2543138.
112 Quoted in Pagden, Lords o f  All the World, 20.
113 Ribault, The whole & true discouerye o f Terra Florida, 94.
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Indian who ran away from his men and, when they caught him, was “so astonished at 
seeing us that he did not know how to behave. I understood afterwards that he feared 
that he had fallen into the hands of Spaniards. These had once captured him and had 
cut out his testicles, as he showed us.” However, Laudonniere and his man managed 
to calm this man’s fear, and he was “happy as he left us.”114 Laudonniere presented 
this dramatic tale of Spanish cruelty without much explanation, but it created for the 
reader an image of a brutal Spain, framing France as a better and kinder European 
power. By providing a concrete example of Ribault’s theory that the French were 
morally superior, Laudonniere supported the idea that the French deserved this power 
and would wield it better than the Spanish. English accounts from their expeditions to 
North America also repeatedly emphasized the hatred Native Americans felt towards 
the Spanish.115
Spanish accounts made very clear that Spanish dominion of the Americas 
would help the Indians because it would allow the Spanish to save their souls. 
Religion was a far more central feature in contemporary Spanish accounts of Florida 
than in either Ribault or Laudonniere’s works. Pedro Menendez, the leader of the 
Spanish attack on Fort Caroline, described his goals in a letter addressed “To His 
Catholic Royal Majesty,” where he outlined his plans to stop any non-Spanish 
“vessels coming from the Indias” and to “Give them no quarter, and appropriate the 
coast and lands so that they can be the more easily turned out -  that Your Majesty can 
send to spread the Gospel.”116 Menendez told men at Fort Caroline who attempted to
114 Laudonniere, Three Voyages, 56.
115 Kupperman, Jamestown Project, 106.
116 Menendez, “Menendez and Fort Caroline,” 127.
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surrender that if they handed over their arms, “I might do with them that which our
Lord ordered. More than this he could not get from me, and that God did not expect
more of me. Thus he returned and they came to deliver up their arms. I had their
hands tied behind them and had them stabbed to death,” sparing only sixteen workers,
caulkers, mariners, and others he believed would be useful. Menendez justified his
cruelty and duplicity by stating “it seemed to me to punish them in this manner would
be serving God, our Lord, and Your Majesty. Hereafter they will leave us free to plant
the Gospel, enlighten the natives, and bring them to obedience and submission to
Your Majesty.”117 Ribault, encountering the Spanish after his ships were destroyed
by a hurricane, offered to surrender to Menendez in exchange for clemency, as France
and Spain were not at war. Menendez did not respond in kind, but by telling Ribault:
How we had taken their Fort and hanged all those we found in it, 
because they had built it without Your Majesty’s permission and 
because they were scattering the odious Lutheran doctrine in these 
Provinces, and that I had [to make] war [with] fire and blood... against 
all those who came to sow this hateful doctrine; representing to him 
that I came by order of Your Majesty to place to Gospel in these parts 
and to enlighten the natives in all that the Holy Church of Rome says 
and does so as to save their souls. That I would not give them passage; 
rather would I follow them by sea and land until I had taken their 
lives.118
This long passage drips with disdain for the “Lutherans” or Huguenots, treating them 
as undeserving of even basic protocol of war. This presents a compelling example of 
the religious justification of Spanish colonization. More than citing the king’s 
authority, although that was significant to him, Menendez justified the great effort, 
expense, and cruelty of the destruction of Fort Caroline through religious language.
117 Menendez, “Menendez and Fort Caroline,” 135.
118 Ibid, 133-134. Brackets in this translation.
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He meant to establish a place from which the Spanish could continue to spread 
Catholicism, and any who got in the way did not, in Menendez’s view, deserve to 
live.119
In the preface for his translation of Laudonniere’s account, Hakluyt repeatedly 
referenced religious goals for colonization. He wrote about reports on Indians of 
North America, from which it could be “gathered that they will easily embrace the 
Gospell, forsaking their idolatrie” and phrased this as encouragement for Ralegh to 
continue this mission.120 Hakluyt framed the goals of those who engage in 
colonization, that “some seeke authoritie and places of commandement, others 
experience by seeing of the world, the most part worldly and transitory gaine, & that 
often times by dishonest and unlawfull meanes, the feswest number the glorie of God 
and the sauving of the soules of the poore & blinded infidels.”121 Yet he expressed 
faith that Ralegh will fall into the last and smallest category; “because divers honest 
and well disposed persons are entred already into this your business, and that I knowe 
you meane hereafter to sende some such good Churchmen thither, as may truely saie
1 O')with the Apostle to the Sauages, We seeke not yours but you.” According to 
Hakluyt, very few had set out to explore America with truly good intentions. His 
emphasis on the rarity of this implies that he did not, even after taking care to 
translate Laudonniere’s account, see the French ventures as primarily religious.
119 There was intense contemporary debate over whether or not Menendez slaughtered 
women and children, a debate that has not been totally resolved. For a discussion of primary 
source documents’ stance on the issue, and their relative reliability, see McGrath, The French 
in Early Florida, 171 -184.





Hakluyt was trained in religion as well as geography, and encouraged colonization so 
avidly both for the good of England and to spread what he believed was the true 
religion across the globe. This also suggests a conviction that English rule would 
be good for the people in the Americas, freeing them from both Spanish and false 
gospels.
The question of religious weight also looms large in the Huguenot leaders’ 
interactions with England. France and England had not historically been allies up 
until this point, but Ribault and Laudonniere both work with and display a willingness 
to rely on English officials and mariners. Some of this may have been to bring down 
Spain, the agreed-upon common enemy. However, it cannot be insignificant that 
Ribault sought help from the most powerful Protestant country when he needed to 
resupply Charlesfort. Ribault had worked in England before, employed by Henry VIII 
and Edward VI as a sort of naval consultant, and was able to quickly navigate the 
English court to gain support. England had been supplying troops to the Protestant 
fighters in France, with whom Ribault had just served, so he reasonably hoped that 
England would be sympathetic to his Huguenot men left behind in Florida.124 Queen 
Elizabeth promised to support an Anglo-French attempt to resupply Charlesfort, 
personally contributing funds to the project and naming Thomas Stukeley as 
commander. In this episode, it seems that Protestantism may have provided a 
common interest that led Queen Elizabeth to work with Ribault. Elizabeth also likely 
saw a French venture in the colonies as a way to undercut Spanish authority. England
123 Mancall discusses this frequently in Hakluyt’s Promise. See especially Chapters 1 and 3.
124 Bennett, “Introduction” in Three Voyages, xiii-xiv; Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 
45.
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had not yet managed to lead a colonizing effort in 1562, and was more than a decade 
away from launching an expedition of their own. Supporting these Protestant 
Frenchmen, especially in such a seemingly tenuous venture, likely seemed as the 
lesser of two evils. As discussed above, Stukeley took command and used the fleet for
• 1 9 Sprivateering rather than rescue. However, this episode still, in Kupperman’s words, 
“exemplifies the tangled relationships, and the lack of clarity, in these early overseas 
exploits,” specifically the ways in which religion could further complicate
1 9Arelationships between imperial powers.
As Benton argued, attempts to establish sovereignty overseas inherently 
involved complex and shifting lines of legality, which often included unexpected and 
tenuous alliances. England, France, and Spain were constantly posturing and 
challenging each other, paying close attention to rival imperial efforts in order to 
undercut others’ power both in Europe and abroad. The actions of those in Florida 
were closely watched and discussed along with general diplomatic correspondence 
and intelligence. While officials at home tried to sort through information and figure 
out other countries’ plans in America, the men trying to establish themselves so far 
from the metropole learned out of necessity to search for support and allies beyond 
their own countrymen. Charlesfort, Fort Caroline, Roanoke, and Jamestown all 
suffered as a result of promised support being delayed and the people that composed 
each imperial effort had to scramble to survive. This led to uneasy alliances with 
other Europeans or, often, with Native Americans. John Smith writes of Jamestown’s
125 It could be argued that this contributed to the intent o f the relief voyage, as attacking 
Spanish ships also helped weaken their imperial control.
126 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 45.
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reliance on Pocahontas and the support of the Powhatans, while the supposedly 
vanished Roanoke colonists most likely melted into a nearby Native American 
community when their own countrymen never returned as promised. In these distant 
and desperate efforts, the normal rules could occasionally be suspended. As Benton 
explains, “The layering of overlapping, semi-sovereign authorities within empires 
generated a lump jurisdictional order, in which legal actors, even rogues... engaged in 
creative legal posturing.”127 These temporary alliances, then, can be seen as attempts 
to create order out of a disordered world of unclear sovereignty and legality; if normal 
rules did not necessarily stand, then one could establish new rules in order to survive 
and persevere in the larger goal of establishing sovereignty in a contested space. Yet, 
however necessary such temporary alliances may have been, evidence repeatedly 
emphasizes how very temporary they were. Leaders who allied with other Europeans 
or Native Americans usually returned their loyalty to their own country and 
countrymen as soon as the world was set right again and they had the option to make 
more purposeful choices instead of merely scrambling to survive. Temporary 
alliances formed in the Americas did not develop into new international relationships 
on a larger scale. As Ribault lobbied for support in England, the court still did not 
trust him and Ribault displayed unease at working with England instead of France. He 
was arrested while trying to find a way back to France with several of his men. His 
men were bailed out to assist the British expedition, which ended up not in Florida, 
but in the Bay of Biscay for several years. Ribault remained imprisoned. Most of the 
survivors of Charlesfort were also imprisoned in Britain, despite French efforts to
127 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 290.
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gain Ribault’s and their return. Ribault’s success in England remained limited, and
he never completely shifted allegiances, despite fighting against the French 
government in 1562 at Dieppe. In the end, the main actors usually retained the 
loyalties they held at the outset of each expedition. At least, the sources show this.
For those who traveled far enough to completely disconnect from their previous lives, 
we can only guess.
While actors on the ground maneuvered through overlapping lines of imperial 
sovereignty, imperial authorities devoted a fair amount of their energy to trying to 
gain a basic understanding of the actions happening overseas. English state papers 
reveal a deep concern with French activities in Florida at this period. Many of these 
letters switch from discussing the latest intrigues at the French or Spanish courts to 
discussing the latest rumors about Florida, showing how closely concerns about royal 
and noble actors and lineages connected with more modem-seeming concerns of 
imperial expansion and uncertain rivalry between European powers. In March of 
1564, William Cecil received a letter that included a section of code. According to an 
apparently contemporary translation of this code, it read “the French doth make ready 
all they shippe they can” and expresses concern that these ships indicated a French 
desire to stir up trouble with England. However, the French apparently claimed “it is 
too go to Terra Florida.” The author recommended readying English ships just in case 
and, if the French proceeded as they claimed they would, those ships could go 
towards English expeditions.129 This letter indicates the complex calculations made
128 For further discussion of Ribault's imprisonment, see McGrath, The French in Early 
Florida, chapter 5.
129 William Phayre to Cecil, 2 June 1565, SP 70/78 f.l 17, The National Archives o f the UK,
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by imperial officials at this time. France readying ships read as a threat, but those 
ships sailing to Florida instead of England would constitute a significantly smaller 
threat. However, even if that were the case, the author seems to believe it prudent to 
have a similar fleet of English ships to put to good use. The rumors about French 
preparations are the only part of the letter in code, suggesting that the author did not 
want the French to know English discussions of their activities, perhaps in an attempt 
to maintain an appearance of trust between the two powers despite English support of 
Protestant Frenchmen. No matter the intent of using a code, it reveals that information 
about French fleets, including those that may sail towards Florida, constituted 
valuable and important intelligence.
Two letters to Cecil, from William Phayre in 1565, discusses English 
knowledge of Melendez’s expedition. The source of this knowledge is unclear, but 
Phayre, the English minister at Madrid, likely gleaned it from sources inside or close 
to the Spanish court. In the first, written in May, Phayre expresses concern for any
1 mEnglish sailors in the area who would be deemed pirates by the Spanish. Hawkins 
had sailed through the area recently, and other English privateers likely continued to 
inhabit those waters. As discussed previously, Philip II considered all vessels that 
were not under Spanish command or approved by Spanish officials to be “peace- 
breakers and robbers.”131 In this instance, English and French goals were closely 
linked. If this Spanish expedition encountered vessels sponsored by either
Accessed January 30, 2015.
http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.wm.edu/mss/i.do?id=GALE|MC4311581221&v=2.1&u=viva 
wm&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=Manuscript 1.
130 William Phayre to Cecil, 12 May 1565.
131 Quoted in Lyon, “The Captives o f Florida,” 2.
66
government, or commanded by citizens of either country, the men would be captured 
or executed. In June of that year, Phayre reported again attempts to clear the French 
from Florida. However, in both accounts he refers to the French leader as 
Villegaignon, echoing earlier confusions between French attempts in Brazil and 
Florida. Prominent diplomatic officials wrote, often, of gossip, carrying forth 
inaccurate assumptions in their correspondence. However, word was clearly 
circulating in the Spanish court of a plan to attack the French at Fort Caroline perhaps 
before Ribault even left France to reinforce the settlement. Each of these players 
attempted to circulate information and gain accurate intelligence to act upon. The 
careful movement of each of these players almost resembles an ocean-wide game of 
chess, although one where most of the pieces are obscured. Diplomats honed in on 
such rumors and actions, revealing the importance of actions in Florida to general 
international relations in Europe, especially those between France, Spain, and 
England.
Events on the southeastern coast of North America often unfolded rapidly, in 
ways unclear to those attempting to monitor goings on from back in Europe. Those 
involved in such events swirled around each other in a complex tangle of alliances, 
motivations, and authorities, trying to establish their own roles and legacies within 
this murk. Perhaps European uncertainties about some of these events contributed to 
their position largely on the sidelines of Early American History. More likely, 
Charlesfort and Fort Caroline’s lack of permanence led to a diminished legacy. 
However, through affecting the imperial efforts that became Roanoke and Jamestown, 
through helping to perpetuate and codify a symbolic language of sovereignty, and
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through their effects on international and diplomatic relations, Charlesfort and Fort 
Caroline and all of the events surrounding their dramatic falls had a far greater impact 
on American History than many have traditionally assumed.
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Conclusion
The series of decisions made in Europe and on the North American coast from 
1561 through 1607 arguably had a wide-reaching impact on international events for 
centuries. As Lauren Benton argued, during European imperial expansion in the 
Americas sovereignty only existed in the ways it was repeatedly proven through 
various acts from ceremonies to exploration and mapping. The actions surrounding 
Charlesfort and Fort Caroline began a series of closely interconnected European 
displays of sovereignty in a relatively small geographical area, helping to codify a 
shared language of sovereignty that would echo through the following centuries. This 
influence was especially possible because of the intense interconnectivity of 
European discourse and actions regarding Florida between 1560 and the early 
seventeenth century, especially surrounding Charlesfort, Fort Caroline, and Roanoke. 
From simple interpersonal interactions through shared concepts of historical validity, 
overlapping, perforated, and debated layers of sovereignty were established and 
destroyed and negotiated on this stretch of coastline. Such negotiations happened 
throughout all historical imperial expansion. However, the geographically, politically, 
and symbolically linked actions discussed in this essay happened early in the 
development of imperial languages and as such arguably had a larger impact on 
international history than one would suspect from their small size and brief duration. 
If nothing else, these events deserve serious consideration in the construction of 
American historical narratives.
To the imperial actors in the late sixteenth century, history provided both
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models of how to act and legitimization of imperial claims. Roman legal codes, 
medieval legends, and more recent actions served to create a common imperial 
language, one that each power understood even when they did not agree upon the 
interpretation. These dual functions of historical memory could be reduced to mere 
posturing, attempts to convince others to take one’s actions seriously. However, the 
repeated use of such symbolism suggests that it evoked a common feeling among 
Europeans at this time. History provided shorthand to facilitate communication about 
imperial goals. More than that, historical claims served as the basis for real actions 
that irrevocably shaped the futures of Native Americans, England, France, Spain, and 
the world at large. Studying such rhetoric can really impress upon historians the 
importance of critically analyzing perceptions of the past. Yet, in Early American 
History, past events are so tied up in national perceptions of self that they can be 
nearly impossible to analyze objectively.
In the events discussed above, men like John Smith and Sir Walter Ralegh 
jump out as examples of those who have been lauded throughout American history. 
However, in 1964, the four-hundredth anniversary of the French landing at Fort 
Caroline, Charles Bennett sought to add more men to that American pantheon. He put 
together Laudonniere & Fort Caroline: History and Documents to bring these oft- 
forgotten French exploits to light. In the preface, Bennett wrote of how most 
Americans had read about the “great explorers -  Columbus, Vasco de Gama, Ponce 
de Leon, Magellan, Cortez, Pizarro, De Soto, the Cabots, Cartier, and Henry Hudson 
-  but few history textbooks record the activities of Jean Ribault in Florida. Fewer still
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give Laudonniere credit for leading French colonists to North America.”132 Bennett 
wanted to ensure Ribault and Laudonniere’s places in the pantheon of American 
history, to make them names that most Americans would learn in school. Bennett 
argued that:
The Fort Caroline settlement set a new pattern for religious 
freedom in America -  a pattern that was to be imitated until 
religious liberty and personal freedom became the great 
trademark of the United States. The beginnings of the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United 
States stemmed from the spirit of freedom exemplified by 
Laudonniere at Fort Caroline
These Huguenot French are the proto-Pilgrims, according to Bennett, the real
American origin story. As discussed above, Ribault and Laudonniere downplay
religious motivation for their colonization attempts, but many modem Americans
have seen them as part of a grand, Protestant, freedom-seeking tradition, a tradition
inextricably linked the modem nation that exists in the same physical space.
Such mythologies are incredibly powerful, as exemplified by British attempts
to use medieval legends to justify a claim to North America. Whether or not people
wholeheartedly believe such mythologies, they have the power to shape future
actions, to serve as foundations for huge ideas and movements. If, as argued above,
Charlesfort and Fort Caroline should be added to the same historical narrative as
Roanoke and Jamestown, one must be careful to avoid creating persuasive, if
inaccurate, mythologies. Ribault and Laudonniere deserve to be known alongside
Smith and Ralegh, but none of these men should be praised as uncomplicated heroes.
In expanding historical perceptions of the American past, historians must be careful
132 Bennett, “Preface” in Laudonniere and Fort Caroline, viii.
133 Bennett, “The First Part — The History” in Laudonniere and Fort Caroline, 53-54.
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to maintain the same critical eye and not engage in too much spin in order to get 
certain events recognized. Hakluyt built a career out of that kind of work, out of 
framing the accounts of others to further his own goals and the betterment of his 
country. Historians must remain open to additions to these national mythologies while 
remaining wary of the power of such legends. Through following the accounts of 
those involved in colonial ventures in the sixteenth century, historians can add 
essential insight to Early American History, further revealing the intricate and messy 
sovereignties different groups attempted to enact at different times, and how 
performative legal maneuvers affected historical outcomes.
Kupperman framed Jamestown as “the creation story from hell,” a story that 
Americans have deliberately avoided using as their origin myth.134 Charlesfort, Fort 
Caroline, and Roanoke also fall into that category. These narratives show the same 
patterns of ill-prepared men, abandoned by their countrymen and lacking the 
promised support, who mutiny, damage relations with the Native Americans, and 
even resort to cannibalism. If the survivors at Charlesfort had not been found by one 
of Stukeley’s ships, they could have well disappeared just like the Roanoke colonists. 
If the Spanish had attacked Jamestown, as many greatly feared, the accounts would 
have looked remarkably like those from Charlesfort. Jamestown was reinforced in the 
nick of time, but only after those living there had undergone incredible suffering set a 
damaging precedent for interactions with Native Americans. Yet the English finally 
poured enough resources into their colonies to have them succeed. Popular 
imagination has sifted the bad out of these accounts, seeing the beginnings of a nation
134 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 1.
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in these contests over sovereignty. But the hurricanes, the death, and the desperation 
tell a compelling story of what almost was not, a story that can help historians better 
understand tangled European relationships and their common language for enacted 
sovereignty at this time. With this perspective, historians can continue to blur 
arbitrary lines and forge a more comprehensive understanding of the many 
fascinating people and actions that made up Early American History. All of this 
messiness and uncertainty tells a more interesting and a more accurate tale than one 
of preordained greatness, a tale that more Americans should learn.
73
Bibliography
UK National Archives accessed through State Papers Online (organized 
chronologically)
Francis Challoner to Sir Thomas Challoner, 18 December 1563. SP70/66 f.92. The 
National Archives of the UK. Accessed January 30,
2015. http://go.galegroup.com.proxv.wm.edu/mss/i.do?id=GALE|MC431148 
1503&v=2.1 &u=viva wm&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=Manuscript
William Phayre to Cecil, 12 May 1565. SP 70/78 f.41a. The National Archives of the 
UK. Accessed January 30, 2015.
http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.wm.edu/mss/i.do?id=GALE|MC4311581169& 
v=2.1 &u=viva wm&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=Manuscript.
William Phayre to Cecil, 2 June 1565. SP 70/78 f.l 17. The National Archives of the 
UK. Accessed January 30, 2015.
http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.wm.edu/mss/i.do?id=GALElMC4311581221& 
v=2.1 &u=viva wm&it=r&p=SPQL&sw=w&viewtype=Manuscript.
Phayre to Cecil, 22 June 1565. SP 70/78 f.l 73. The National Archives of the UK. 
Accessed June 30, 2015.
http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.wm.edu/mss/i.do?id=GALElMC4311581263& 
v=2.1 &u=viva wm&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=Manuscript.
Robert Hogan to the Earl of Leicester, 30 June 1565. SP 70/78 f.214. The National 
Archives of the UK. Accessed January 30, 2015.
http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.wm.edu/mss/i.do?id=GALE|MC4311581279& 
v=2.1 &u=viva wm&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=Manuscript.
Phayre to Cecil, 31 July 1565. SP 70/79 f.72. The National Archives of the UK. 
Accessed January 30, 2015.
http://go.galegroup.com.proxv.wm.edu/mss/i.do?id=GALE|MC4311581341& 
v=2.1 &u=viva wm&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=Manuscript.
Phayre to Cecil, 17 November 1565. SP 70/81 f.26. The National Archives of the UK. 
Accessed January 30, 2015.
http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.wm.edu/mss/i.do?id=GALElMC4311581611& 
v=2.1 &u=viva wm&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=:Manuscript.
Smith to Leicester and Cecil, 13 December 1565. SP 70/81 f .l06. The National 




Advices from Sir Thomas Smith to the Earl of Leicester, 23 January 1566. SP 70/82 
f.38. The National Archives of the UK. Accessed January 30, 2015. 
http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.wm.edu/mss/i.do?id=GALE|MC4311680044& 
v=2.1 &u=viva wm&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w& viewtype=Manuscript.
Francis Chamberlain to Sec. Sir Wm. Cecil, 31 August 1566. SP 15/13 f.47. The 
National Archives of the UK.
http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.wm.edu/mss/i.do?id=GALElMC4304780030& 
v=2.1 &u=viva wm&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=Manuscript.
Sir Henry Norris to the Queen, 23 June, 1568. SP 70/98 f .l49. The National Archives 




Hakluyt, Richard “7 April 1585. Richard Hakluyt to Sir Francis Walsingham.” In The 
Roanoke Voyages 1584-1590: Documents to Illustrate the English Voyages to 
North America Under the Patent Granted to Walter Ralegh, Volume 1. Edited 
by David Beers Quinn, 155. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1991.
Hakluyt, Richard. "To the Right Worthie and Honorable Gentleman, Sir Walter 
Ralegh knight, seneschal of the Duchies of Come wall and Exeter, and L. 
Warden of the stannaries in Devon and Corenwall. R. H. wisheth tme felicitie, 
in Rene Goulaine de Laudonniere, A notable historie containing foure 
voyages made by certayne French captaynes unto Florida Translated by R. H. 
[Richard Hakluyt]. London: Thomas Dawson, 1587. Accessed 10 October, 
2013.
http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxv.wm.edu/servlet/Sabin?dd=Q&af:=RN&locI 
D=viva wm&srchtp=a&dl =S ABCPO1915100&c=T &an=SABCPO1915100& 
ste= 11 &stp=Author&dc=flc&d4=0.33&docNum=C Y102128609&ae=C Y102 
128609&tiPG=T.
Laudonniere, Rene Goulaine de. A notable historie containing foure voyages made by 
certayne French captaynes unto Florida. Translated by R. H. [Richard 
Hakluyt].London: Thomas Dawson, 1587. Accessed 10 October, 2013. 
http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxv.wm.edu/servlet/Sabin?dd=Q&af=RN&locI 
D=viva wm&srchtp=a&d 1 =S ABCPO 1915100&c= 1 &an=S ABCPO 1915100& 
ste=l 1 &stp=Author&dc=flc&d4=0.33&docNum=C Y102128609&ae=C Y102 
128609&tiPG=l
Laudonniere, Rene Goulaine de. Three Voyages; Rene Laudonniere, edited by 
Charles E. Bennett. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001.
75
Le Challeux, Nicolas. “Octet.” In Laudonniere and Fort Caroline: History and
Documents, edited and translated by Charles E. Bennett, 164. Tuscaloosa, AL: 
The University of Alabama Press, 2001.
Le Challeux, Nicolas. “Little Letter.” In Laudonniere and Fort Caroline: History and 
Documents, edited and translated by Charles E. Bennett, 164-165. Tuscaloosa, 
AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2001.
Manrique de Rojas, Hernando. “The Report of Manrique de Rojas.” In Laudonniere 
and Fort Caroline: History and Documents, edited by Charles E. Bennett, 
107-124. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2001.
Menendez, Pedro. “Menendez and Fort Caroline.” In Laudonniere and Fort Caroline: 
History and Documents, translated by Annie Avarette and edited by Charles 
E. Bennett, 125-139. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2001.
“The Petition of the Widows and Orphans of Fort Caroline.” In Laudonniere and Fort 
Caroline: History and Documents, edited by Charles E. Bennett, 166-170. 
Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2001.
Quinn, David Beers ed. New American World: A Documentary History o f North 
America to 1512, Volume II: Major Spanish Searches in North America. 
Franco-Spanish Clash in Florida. The Beginnings o f Spanish Florida. New 
York: Amo Press, 1979.
Quinn, David B. ed. The Roanoke Voyages 1584-1590: Documents to Illustrate the 
English Voyages to North America Under the Patent Granted to Walter 
Ralegh, Volumes I & II. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1991.
Ribault, Jean. The whole & true discouerye o f Terra Florida. Gainesville, FL: 
University of Florida Press, 1964.
Smith, John. Captain John Smith: A Select Edition o f His Writings Edited by Karen 
Ordahl Kupperman. Translated by Karen Ordahl Kupperman. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
Sparke, John. “The Voyage made by M. John Hawkins Esquire, and afterward knight, 
Captaine of the Jesus of Lubek, one of her Majesties shippes, and Generali of 
the Saloman, and other two barkes going in his companie to the coast of 
Guinea, and the Indies of Nova Hispania, begun in An. Dom. 1564” in 
Hakluyt’s Voyages: The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques & 
Discoveries o f the English Nation, Made by Sea or Over-land to the Remote 
and Farthest Distant Quarters o f the Earth at any time within the compasse o f 
these 1600 Yeeres by Richard Hakluyt Preacher, and sometimes Student o f
76
Christ Church in Oxford. Edited by Irwin R. Blacker, 115-160. New York: 
The Viking Press, 1965.
Secondary Sources:
Arana, Luis Rafael. “The Exploration of Florida and Sources on the Founding of 
St. Augustine.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 44, No. Vz (Jul-Oct 1965, 
Quadricentennial Edition): 1-16. Accessed October 5, 2013. 
http://www.istor.org/stable/30147723.
Benton, Lauren. A Search For Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European 
Empires, 1400-1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Bennett, Charles E. “Fort Caroline, Cradle of American Freedom.” The Florida 
Historical Quarterly. 35, No. 1 (Jul 1956): 3-16. Accessed September 20, 
2013. http://www.istor.Org/stable/30138940.
Bennett, Charles E. “The First Part -  The History.” In Laudonniere and Fort 
Caroline: History and Documents, edited by Charles E. Bennett, 3-60. 
Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2001.
Boucher, Philip P. France and the American Tropics to 1700: Tropics o f Discontent? 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.
Boucher, Philip P. Review of The French in Early Florida: In the Eye o f the
Hurricane by John T. McGrath. The International History Review 23 (Dec., 
2001): 896, accessed November 15, 2011. 
http://www.istor.org/stable/40108852.
Carey, Daniel and Claire Jowitt, ed. Richard Hakluyt and Travel Writing in Early 
Modern Europe. Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2012.
Davis, Frederick T. “Fort Caroline.” The Florida Historical Society Quarterly. 12, 
No. 2 (Oct. 1933): 77-83. Accessed September 20, 2013. 
http://www.istor.org/stable/30150160.
Eccles, W. J. France in America. Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 
1990.
Fishman, Laura. “Old World Images Encounter New World Reality: Rene
Laudonniere and the Timucuans of Florida.” The Sixteenth Century Journal 
26, No. 3 (Autumn 1995): 547-559. Accessed September 21, 2013. 
http://www.istor.org/stable/2543138.
Gannon, Michael V. “Altar and Hearth: The Coming of Christianity 1521-1565.” The
11
Florida Historical Quarterly 44, No. V2 (Jul-Oct 1965, Quadricentennial 
Edition): 17-44. Accessed October 5, 2013. 
http://www.istor.org/stable/30147724.
Goldman, William S. “Spain and the Founding of Jamestown.” The William and 
Mary Quarterly 68 (July, 2011) 427-450. Accessed February 2, 2015. 
http://www.istor.Org/stable/10.5309/willmaryquar.68.3.0427.
Gorman, M. Adele Francis. “Jean Ribault’s Colonies in Florida.” The Florida
Historical Quarterly 44, No. V2 (Jul-Oct 1965, Quadricentennial Edition): 51- 
66. Accessed October 5, 2013. http://www.jstor.Org/stable/30147726.
Hoffman, Paul E. Florida ’s Frontiers. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.
Hoffman, Paul E. “The Chicora Legend and Franco-Spanish Rivalry in La Florida.” 
The Florida Historical Quarterly 62, No. 4 (Apr 1984): 419-438. Accessed 
September 21. http://www.istor.org/stable/30146593.
Hoffman, Paul. A New Andalucla and a Way to the Orient. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1990.
Holt, Mack P. The French Wars o f Religion: 1562-1629. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005.
Knecht, Robert J. The French Religious Wars 1562-1598. Oxford, UK: Osprey 
Publishing, 2002.
Kupperman, Karen Ordahl. Roanoke: The Abandoned Colony. 2nd edition. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007.
Kupperman, Karen Ordahl. The Jamestown Project. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap 
Press, 2007.
Kupperman, Karen Ordahl. “Before 1607.” The William and Mary Quarterly 72 (Jan., 
2015) 3-24. Accessed February 2, 2015. 
http://www.istor.org/stable/10.5309/willmarvquar.72.1.0003.
Lestringant, Frank. L'experience huguenote au Nouveau Monde : XVIe siecle.
Geneve: Libr. Droz, 1996.
Lestringant, Frank. Le huguenot et le sauvage : TAmerique et la controverse coloniale 
en France, au temps des guerres de religion. Paris: Aux Amateurs de livres: 
1990.
Lyon, Eugene. “The Captives of Florida.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 50 (Jul.,
78
1971) 1-24. Accessed February 3, 2015. http://wwwistor.org/stable/30140435.
Mancall, Peter C. Hakluyt’s Promise: An Elizabethan Obsession for an English 
America. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
Manucy, Albert. “The Man Who Was Pedro Menendez.” The Florida Historical 
Quarterly 44, No. Vi (Jul-Oct 1965, Quadricentennial Edition): 67-80. 
Accessed October 5, 2013. http://www.istor.org/stable/30147727.
McGrath, John T. The French in Early Florida: In the Eye o f the Hurricane. 
Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2001.
Oberg, Michael Leroy. The Head in Edward Nugent’s Hand: Roanoke’s Forgotten 
Indians. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Pagden, Anthony. Lords o f All the World: Ideologies o f Empire in Spain, Britain, and 
France c. 1500 -  c. 1800. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.
Quinn, David B. North America From Earliest Discovery to First Settlements: The 
Norse Voyages to 1612. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975.
Quinn, David B. Set Fair for Roanoke: Voyages and Colonies 1584-1606. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
Quinn, David B. Explorers and Colonies: America, 1500-1625. London: The 
Hambledon Press, 1990.
Quinn, David Beers. The Roanoke Voayges 1584-1590: Documents to Illustrate the 
English Voyages to North America Under the Patent Granted to Walter 
Ralegh, Volume 1 and II. Edited by David Beers Quinn, 155. New York: 
Dover Publications, Inc., 1991.
Seed, Patricia. Ceremonies o f Possession in Europe’s Conquest o f the New World, 
1492-1640. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Stoler, Laura Anna and Carole McGranahan. “Imperial Formations” in Stoler,
McGranahan, and Perdue, eds., Imperial Formations, edited by Laura Ann 
Stoler and Carole McGranahan, 3-44. Santa Fe: School for Advanced 
Research Press, 2007.
79
